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TO TRANSFER OR NOT TO TRANSFER:  
IDENTIFYING AND PROTECTING RELEVANT 
HUMAN RIGHTS INTERESTS                                            
IN NON-REFOULEMENT 
Vijay M. Padmanabhan*
 
 
Human rights law imposes upon States an absolute duty not to transfer 
an individual to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing he or she will be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment.  This protection, called non-refoulement, emanates 
from a theory of human rights that recognizes rights fulfillment requires 
States to protect those within their jurisdiction from rights violations 
perpetrated by third parties, including other States.  Generally human 
rights law recognizes that resource constraints and/or competing rights 
restrict protection duties.  But such limitations have not been recognized in 
the non-refoulement context. 
In recent years the obligation to provide non-refoulement protection has 
run into conflict with the State’s obligation to protect its public from aliens 
suspected of involvement in terrorism.  Expulsion is the traditional tool 
available to States to mitigate the threat posed by dangerous aliens.  With 
this tool removed, States often lack an alternative route to mitigate this 
threat, with criminal prosecution and indefinite detention pending 
deportation not available for various reasons.  The result has been 
numerous cases where States have been forced either to release dangerous 
aliens back onto the street, consistent with international law, or to find 
alternative means to deal with the threat in the shadow of human rights 
law. 
This Article argues that there is a clash of human rights duties that arises 
in these transfer situations:  the State’s duty to protect aliens from post-
transfer mistreatment conflicts with its duty to protect members of the 
public from rights violations committed by dangerous private persons 
within society.  Human rights law has in recent years recognized a duty on 
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States.  Special thanks to Jonathan Eskow and James Fantau for their work as research 
assistants on this piece.  Also thanks to Geoffrey Corn, Ashley S. Deeks, Ryan Goodman, 
Monica Hakimi, Michel Rosenfeld, Matthew Waxman, Ingrid Wuerth, and the Junior 
Faculty Working Group at Cardozo Law School without whose thoughtful engagement this 
piece would not be possible. 
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the part of States to take reasonable operational measures to protect the 
public from private person harms where the State knows or should know of 
the risk.  In the case of dangerous aliens, these operational measures 
presumably would include expulsion.  By depriving the State of the ability 
to expel dangerous aliens, non-refoulement protection places the human 
rights of dangerous aliens and the public into direct conflict. 
Recognition of this rights competition is important for two reasons.  
First, for too long human rights scholars and bodies have dismissed the 
security consequences of non-refoulement as outside the concern of human 
rights.  Acceptance that these security consequences themselves affect 
human rights requires consideration of how the law should address the 
conflict.  Second, once a rights competition is accepted, human rights law 
prescribes a methodology for mediating between conflicting rights:  
balancing.  A balancing approach would allow States a margin of 
appreciation to determine in the first instance how to choose between 
competing duties.  The role of human rights apparatus, including national 
courts, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations, is to 
monitor this balance and to push States where the balance chosen appears 
over or under rights protective. 
A balancing approach has at least three major advantages.  First, it 
brings within the law both relevant sets of human rights, ensuring that the 
rights competition in which States are engaged is recognized by the law.  
This recognition allows for better monitoring by the human rights 
apparatus, and reduces the incentives of States to act outside of the law in 
protecting the public.  Second, balancing reduces the security consequences 
for States of granting additional categories of post-transfer mistreatment 
non-refoulement protection—a major goal of the human rights movement—
thereby increasing the likelihood States will accept such future obligations.  
Third, by balancing the need to protect rights between both the transferring 
and receiving States, a balancing approach may actually lead to a more 
comprehensive anti-torture strategy, and therefore reduced occurrence of 
the practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In April 2009, British police detained ten Pakistani men who were in the 
United Kingdom on student visas for alleged involvement in a plot to bomb 
a British shopping center in a “mass casualty” operation on behalf of al 
Qaida.1  British police had the ten men under surveillance based on 
intercepted e-mails and other intelligence information suggesting an 
imminent attack on a Manchester mall, but were forced to move to detain 
the suspects immediately after the details of the plot and the police plans to 
thwart it were discovered by the press.2  The resulting premature raids 
turned up no explosives or bomb-making equipment, leading Her Majesty’s 
Government (HMG) to conclude terrorism charges could not be brought 
against the suspects.3
Instead, HMG moved to deport the men to Pakistan, including Abid 
Naseer, alleged plot ringleader, whose presence in the United Kingdom was 
deemed “a threat to national security.”
 
4  Naseer contested the finding that 
he posed a threat to the national security of the United Kingdom.5  He also 
opposed removal on grounds that he faced a real risk of torture or inhuman 
and degrading treatment in Pakistan.6  Transfer under such circumstances 
would violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).7  The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has interpreted 
this provision to include an implicit obligation not to transfer individuals to 
a State where they face real risk of torture or inhuman and degrading 
treatment after transfer, which is the principle of non-refoulement.8
The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) ruled in favor of 
Naseer.
 
9
 
 1. See John F. Burns, Deportation Case Presents Test of British Government, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 19, 2010, at A8. 
  After evaluating intelligence and other closed materials as well as 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See Immigration Rules, pt. 9, ¶ 322(5) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/immigrationlaw/immigrationrules/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2011) (allowing denial of leave to remain in the United Kingdom because of 
“the undesirability of permitting the person concerned to remain in the United Kingdom in 
the light of his character, conduct or associations or the fact that he represents a threat to 
national security”); see also Burns, supra note 1. 
 5. See Burns, supra note 1. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR] 
(“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”). 
 8. See infra notes 71–79 and accompanying text (discussing ECtHR case law).  
Traditionally, the term “refoulement” refers only to summary refusal to admit an alien who 
has no lawful right of entry into the State and summary repatriation of an alien found 
illegally in the territory of the State (reconduction).  Refoulement can be contrasted to 
expulsion or deportation, which requires lawfully-present aliens to be removed after a legal 
process. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
201 (3d ed. 2007).  For purposes of this Article, non-refoulement refers more broadly to the 
prohibition of all kinds of transfer based on risk of post-transfer mistreatment. 
 9. Naseer v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [May 18, 2010] No. 
SC77/80/21/82/83/09 (Special Immigration Appeals Comm’n [S.I.A.C.]), slip op. ¶ 37 
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an extensive e-mail correspondence between Naseer and an al Qaida 
member in Pakistan, SIAC credited HMG’s allegations that Naseer was in 
the final stages of planning an attack on a shopping mall in northwest 
England.10  This led Justice Mitting to conclude that “Naseer was an Al 
Qaeda operative who posed and still poses a serious threat to the national 
security of the United Kingdom.”11  Nevertheless, Mitting held that 
deportation to Pakistan was not permissible, consistent with the principle of 
non-refoulement.12  SIAC noted the history of Pakistani intelligence 
officials mistreating alleged Islamic militants, and refused to accept HMG’s 
argument that the public notoriety of the case would ensure Naseer’s 
safety.13
The decision left HMG with few options to mitigate the “serious threat to 
the national security of the United Kingdom” posed by Naseer.
 
14  
Prosecution in the case was not possible because of the lack of physical 
evidence linking Naseer to the bomb plot.  Preventive detention pending 
deportation in similar circumstances was found to violate the ECHR by the 
British Law Lords.15  And deportation to a country other than Pakistan was 
virtually impossible because no State would accept a suspected al Qaida 
terrorist for resettlement.  HMG was left imposing control orders, or parole-
like restrictions, on Naseer’s movement and employment, with the 
knowledge that similar restrictions have been easily evaded by others in the 
past.16
The Naseer case is an example of the serious security consequences that 
may result from providing non-refoulement protection in a post 9/11 world.  
The principle of non-refoulement has been justified by human rights bodies 
and advocates as a part of the jus cogens prohibition on torture and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment.
 
17
 
(U.K.), available at http://www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/Documents/outcomes/
1_OpenJudgment.pdf. 
  While these prohibitions are 
 10. See id. ¶¶ 7–15; see also Burns, supra note 1. 
 11. Naseer, slip op. ¶ 16. 
 12. See id. ¶¶ 30–39. 
 13. See id. ¶¶ 32–34. 
 14. See id. ¶ 16. 
 15. See A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, [68] (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (rejecting British law pending indefinite detention of aliens suspected of 
terrorism pending deportation as a violation of the European Convention).  
 16. See Burns, supra note 1; see also Colm O’Cinneide, Strapped to the Mast:  The 
Siren Song of Dreadful Necessity, the United Kingdom, Human Rights Act and Terrorist 
Threat, in FRESH PERSPECTIVES ON THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ 327, 343 (Miriam Gani & 
Penelope Mathew eds., 2008) (describing failures of the control order system). 
 17. For shorthand purposes, this Article will refer to the “jus cogens torture norm” to 
encompass both torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 cmt. n (1987) (describing as jus cogens prohibition on 
“torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”).  As discussed 
below, the criteria for concluding a norm is jus cogens is unclear, see infra notes 247–48 and 
accompanying text, and scholars and courts have contested whether cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment rises to the level of jus cogens, see Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 
1531, 1543 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (refusing to recognize cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
as a cognizable violation of the Alien Tort Statute because of the lack of consensus on 
meaning of the terms); ABA, Report to the House of Delegates (Aug. 9, 2004) in THE 
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traditionally thought to forbid a State from employing torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, human rights bodies have explained that if 
a State cannot subject an individual to these forms of mistreatment, neither 
may they send the individual to a State where that mistreatment may 
occur.18  Because there are no exceptions to the torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment prohibitions in human rights law, these bodies have 
concluded that there are no exceptions to non-refoulement either.19  In 
recent years, human rights bodies also have sought to expand the scope of 
non-refoulement protection to other human rights abuses, seeking to 
prohibit transfer where there is a real risk to the transferee of enforced 
disappearance, unfair post-transfer trial, or recruitment as a child soldier.20
Ever-expanding non-refoulement duties deprive States of a traditional 
tool used to protect its population from security threats posed by aliens:  
expulsion.  Unlike nationals of a State, who are legally entitled to be present 
in the State, aliens are present at the prerogative of the host State.  States 
have traditionally used this plenary authority over the presence of aliens to 
exclude or expel dangerous aliens.
 
21  Depriving States of this tool may 
leave them, as in the Naseer case, with no real option to mitigate real 
threats.22  This concern, magnified by the threat of terrorism, has led a 
variety of States to advocate a change in the non-refoulement rule to permit 
States to consider the security risk the alien poses to the State as a factor in 
determining whether transfer is possible.23  Such a change would hark back 
to the origins of non-refoulement protections, which included security 
exceptions.24  The security consequences of accepting non-refoulement 
duties also have led States to resist expansion of non-refoulement protection 
to lesser forms of mistreatment as advocated by human rights institutions.25
The human rights apparatus has resisted such a change for two reasons.  
First, it argues that the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment is absolute, and not subject to exception.
 
26
 
TORTURE PAPERS:  THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 1132, 1146 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. 
Dratel eds., 2005) (“While many international agreements expressly prohibit both torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, it remains an open question as to whether jus 
cogens status extends to the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”); 
Richard B. Lillich, Remarks to the American Society of International Law (Apr. 26, 1985), 
in The Revised Draft Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and 
Customary International Law, 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 73, 86 (1985) (noting that 
commentators might not consider the norm prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment “customary international law, much less of jus cogens”). 
  Opening 
 18. See infra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 22. See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text. 
 23. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); 
see also Observations of the Governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom, Ramzy v. Netherlands, App. No. 25424/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) [hereinafter 
Observations], available at http://www.redress.org/Government_intervenors_observations_
in_Ramzy_case%20_21November.pdf.  
 24. See infra notes 55–58, 63–69 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra Part I.C. 
 26. See infra notes 71–86, 89–91 and accompanying text. 
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non-refoulement protection to exceptions, advocates worry, will lead to 
similar exceptions to the basic prohibition on States torturing or otherwise 
severely mistreating individuals.27  The result, the apparatus fears, is 
policies like enhanced interrogation and rendition used by the Bush 
Administration to combat terrorism.28  Second, it contends that even if 
human rights law wanted to account for the threat posed by the alien to the 
host State, it could not do so given the incomparable nature of the threat 
posed by the alien and the threat the alien himself faces.  The result would 
be an apples-to-oranges comparison outside the scope of human rights 
law.29
These arguments fail to account for the human rights costs of the current 
rule.  Allowing dangerous aliens to remain free within society risks their 
commission of acts that constitute serious violations of human rights.  This 
reality has led States to take measures to mitigate the security consequences 
of granting non-refoulement protection that have negative second-order 
human rights effects.  States have refused to capture or admit aliens from 
countries where repatriation will be difficult, harming those aliens or those 
at threat from their actions in the process.
 
30  Some States also have misused 
diplomatic assurances, or promises from the receiving State not to mistreat 
transferred persons, to feign compliance with existing non-refoulement 
rules, while in fact subjecting the transferred person to substantial risk of 
mistreatment, without assessment of whether the threat in question merits 
such a harsh result.31  The resulting distortions in the law have led officials 
of at least one State to consider withdrawing from its non-refoulement 
obligations entirely.32
The full range of human rights equities at issue in non-refoulement has 
not been captured because of the failure to identify the relevant State duties 
and rights at issue in non-refoulement.  It has been thirty years since Henry 
Shue identified three duties that exist with all human rights obligations:  the 
duty to avoid harm, the duty to protect from the harm, and the duty to aid 
individuals in fulfillment of their right.
  At minimum, it has led to State opposition to further 
expansion of non-refoulement protections. 
33
 
 27. See infra note 
  Properly understood, States 
181 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra notes 183–84 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 32. The Conservative Party’s winning manifesto in the 2010 elections called for the 
repeal of the Human Rights Act, which implements the ECHR into British law, in part 
because of concerns regarding non-refoulement protection. See Andrew Sparrow & Patrick 
Wintour, Coalition Reconsidering Tory Plan to Scrap Human Rights Act, GUARDIAN (May 
19, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/may/19/theresa-may-coalition-human-
rights-act-scrap (quoting Conservative Party manifesto); see also David Stringer, UK:  
European Law Hampering Terrorism Fight, ABC NEWS, Feb. 3, 2011, 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=12830352 (describing report by Lord 
Carlile, House of Lords terrorism monitor, arguing ECHR is turning the U.K. into a refuge 
for international terrorism).  Coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, forced the Tories to 
abandon this campaign pledge as part of the coalition agreement. 
 33. See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:  SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY 60 (1980).  Shue explained the three distinct State duties as follows:  (1) the duty to 
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making transfer determinations with respect to dangerous aliens face a 
conflict between two competing duties to protect. 
One such duty is well developed.  States have a duty to protect aliens 
from the risk of serious human rights abuses perpetrated by another State 
after transfer.  Such a duty has already been recognized with torture and 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by most States and human rights 
actors, and may in the future be accepted for other, less serious human 
rights violations.34  Less developed is the growing recognition by human 
rights bodies that a State has a duty to protect those within its jurisdiction 
from human rights violations committed by non-State actors, including 
dangerous aliens present within the State’s territory.35  Such an obligation 
has been recognized by the ECtHR, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), and various national courts as 
emanating from the right to life and the right to be free of torture and cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment.36
Recognizing this rights competition is important for three reasons.  First, 
a change in rhetoric has the potential to alter the non-refoulement debate.  
Human rights bodies and scholars for too long have elided over the security 
consequences of the current non-refoulement rule because they believed 
these costs were outside the province of human rights law.
  It is these two duties, and the 
corresponding human rights, that conflict in transfer determinations 
regarding dangerous aliens. 
37
Second, understanding non-refoulement as a protection duty provides an 
intellectual architecture to separate it from the jus cogens prohibition on 
committing acts of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.  
Protection duties in human rights law are traditionally limited by competing 
resources and conflicting rights, restrictions which are anomalously missing 
here.
  In fact, human 
rights are threatened when dangerous aliens are permitted to remain free to 
commit rights violations.  Determining how the State should mediate 
between these two conflicting protection duties is very much a task for 
human rights law. 
38
 
avoid:  negative duty not to violate the right in question; (2) the duty to protect:  positive 
duty to prevent third parties from violating the right; and (3) the duty to aid:  positive duty to 
take steps to allow individuals to realize their right. Id. at 53. 
  Recognizing such constraints on non-refoulement would bring the 
State’s non-refoulement obligation into accord with the duty to protect from 
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment perpetrated by private 
persons.  And it would align the law with the traditional legal view that 
 34. See infra notes 70–86, 89–91, 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 35. The United States has been a conspicuous laggard in accepting these developments. 
See infra notes 209–14 (describing U.S. opposition to most positive human rights). 
 36. See infra notes 219–20, 227–39 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, There’s No Place like Home:  States’ Obligations in 
Relation to Transfers of Persons, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 703, 707 (2008) (addressing in a 
cursory fashion the security consequences created by granting non-refoulement protection). 
 38. See infra notes 242–43 and accompanying text. 
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greater duties are owed with respect to intentional actions as opposed to 
unintentional actions taken with disregard of substantial risk of harm.39
Third, human rights law uses a balancing approach to mediate between 
competing rights.  Balancing is used in human rights law to weigh such 
diverse interests as the right to free speech versus freedom of religion; the 
right to assemble versus the State’s interest in protecting public order; and 
the State’s obligation to provide health care versus other competing 
obligations for State resources.
 
40
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I develops the narrative of non-
refoulement today.  States have traditionally had plenary authority to 
protect State interests through expulsion of aliens.  But human rights law 
has slowly chipped away at that right through recognition of ever greater 
State obligations to retain aliens when facing risk of post-transfer 
mistreatment.  This legal evolution, always under-theorized, has been 
subjected to ever greater resistance by some States because of the serious 
danger that implementation of the rule creates with alien terrorist suspects.  
The failure of the law to adjust has led States to use different methods to 
evade the non-refoulement rule, and to oppose further expansion of its 
protections. 
  A balancing approach allows States a 
margin of appreciation to strike a balance between competing rights 
consistent with national priorities, recognizing differences in how States 
may value different rights.  Human rights monitoring bodies, including 
national courts, then police this balance, using different tools to pressure 
States whose balance does not accord with the views of those institutions 
regarding the importance of both rights. 
Part II explains that the non-refoulement debate is properly conceived as 
a conflict between two competing State duties to protect human rights.  
States are required to protect those within their jurisdictions from the threat 
of human rights violations committed by other States.  States also are 
required to protect those within the State’s jurisdiction from rights 
violations committed by non-State actors, including dangerous aliens.  
These duties are in tension in non-refoulement.  Understanding both 
relevant duties as protection duties highlights the extent to which non-
refoulement is an outlier in human rights law, which otherwise recognizes 
limitations on protection duties.  This Part argues that non-refoulement 
should be treated like other protection duties, and be subject to limitations 
and exceptions.  It also refutes the argument that the power of the torture 
norm compels the existing rule. 
Part III explains that human rights law generally uses balancing to 
mediate between conflicting rights.  Human rights law balancing gives 
States discretion to strike a balance between competing duties consistent 
with cultural values and national priorities, thereby giving States some 
flexibility to remain within a human rights law framework while protecting 
its population.  But this discretion is not unbridled, as human rights 
 
 39. See infra notes 257–58 and accompanying text. 
 40. See infra notes 268–73 and accompanying text. 
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institutions, including national courts, monitor States to push them to strike 
balances that are consistent with the values underlying human rights law.  
The effectiveness of this monitoring is improved when human rights groups 
can engage with the rights trade-off driving State action, not permissible 
under the current rule.  This part concludes by considering the problems of 
bias and uncertainty created by the use of a balancing approach. 
Ultimately, international law, as a system largely dependent upon 
voluntary State compliance, functions best where the law captures the 
interests of States.  Rules which produce outcomes recognized by States as 
“incoherent, unfair, or absurd” are unlikely to pull States toward voluntary 
compliance.41
I.  NON-REFOULEMENT RULE:  HISTORY, TENSION, ADJUSTMENT 
  By moving to a new non-refoulement rule that recognizes 
the duty of the State to protect its own people, enhanced rights protection 
and more stable rule compliance are likely outcomes. 
A.  Development of the Modern Non-Refoulement Rule 
International law recognizes the absolute sovereignty of a State over its 
territory, which includes the right to decide whether to admit or expel 
aliens, except where otherwise restricted by treaty commitments or 
customary international law.42  This authority gives States the ability to use 
admission and expulsion to combat threats to national security posed by 
dangerous aliens.  Through World War II, concerns about the risk of post-
transfer mistreatment generally did not restrict State discretion with respect 
to aliens.43  Prior to the war, a small number of European States did enter 
into agreements restricting expulsion of Russian or German refugees who 
faced risk of mistreatment upon repatriation, if they had been granted the 
right to reside in a contracting State.  But these treaties had few adherents, 
and allowed States to remove refugees where required by national security 
or public order.44
 
 41. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 84 (1990).  Using 
Franck’s terminology, the current non-refoulement rule may be thought of as an “idiot rule,” 
meaning a simple rule that creates unreasonable and illegitimate demands at the margins. Id. 
at 77.  Franck explains that such results tend to undermine the rule’s overall legitimacy, a 
phenomenon that this Article supports. See id. (describing effects of “idiot rules”). 
  As a result, States that fought World War II retained 
plenary control over admission and deportation of aliens. 
 42. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 940 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th 
ed. 1996); see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment 15:  The Position 
of Aliens Under the Covenant, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. No. A/41/40 (Apr. 11, 1986) (“The Covenant 
does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party.  It is 
in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory.”). 
 43. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 8, at 201–03 (summarizing 
developments in international law before and during World War II). 
 44. See Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees art. 3, Oct. 28, 1933, 
159 L.N.T.S. 199 (“Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or keep from 
its territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the 
frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorized to reside there regularly, unless 
the said measures are dictated by reasons of national security or public order.”); see also 
Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany art. 5, Feb. 10, 1938, 
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States used this authority during and after the War in a manner that 
resulted in many innocent deaths.  In some instances States refused 
admission to individuals fleeing severe mistreatment at home, forcing them 
to return to their home countries and near-certain death.  Switzerland, for 
example, refused entry to nearly 20,000 French Jews who sought asylum 
there after the Nazi takeover of France.45  The Swiss argued the “boat is 
full” with respect to refugees during the War, and they were not obligated 
under existing law to accept French Jews for resettlement.46  As a result the 
Jews were forced to return to France, where most were killed.47  In 1939, a 
ship with hundreds of Germans seeking refuge was turned away summarily 
by the United States because of a policy not to admit anyone into the 
country that lacked a valid visa for admission.48  The ship returned to 
Europe, and predictably many of the passengers ended up dead.49
In other instances, States transferred aliens who were already present 
within their territory to their home government, again resulting in severe 
mistreatment or death.  Wartime and post-war transfers to the Soviet Union 
resulted in the death or severe mistreatment of over two million people.
 
50  
The United States and the United Kingdom committed to repatriating all 
Soviet prisoners after the war, with no provision made for prisoners who 
expressed fears of mistreatment after transfer.51  True to the agreement, the 
Western Allies transferred to the Soviets prisoners who expressed fears of 
mistreatment.52  Tragically, these fears of mistreatment came true, with 
Stalin subjecting many repatriated prisoners to Siberian labor camps, or 
even execution.53  The British also made forcible returns to the Soviets of 
civilians who fell outside the Yalta agreement, including women and 
children.54
These wartime practices highlighted the need for treaty-based regimes 
restricting the transfer of persons who face the risk of post-transfer 
 
 
192 L.N.T.S. 59 (same for German refugees); Provisional Arrangement Concerning the 
Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, art. 4, July 4, 1936, 171 L.N.T.S. 75 (same). 
 45. See Detlev F. Vagts, Switzerland, International Law and World War II, 91 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 466, 472 (1997) (describing lawful Swiss refugee practice that resulted in deaths of 
20,000 French Jews). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See BARBARA MCDONALD STEWART, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY ON 
REFUGEES FROM NAZISM:  1933–1940, at 440–43 (1982) (detailing incident involving the S.S. 
St. Louis). 
 49. See id. 
 50. NIKOLAI TOLSTOY, VICTIMS OF YALTA 19 (1977). 
 51. See, e.g., Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces 
Operating Under Soviet Command and Forces Operating Under United States of America 
Command, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. 1, Feb. 11, 1945, 59 Stat. 1874 (“All Soviet citizens liberated 
by the forces operating under United States command . . . will, without delay after their 
liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from 
them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet . . . 
authorities . . . .”). 
 52. See CHRISTIANE SHIELDS DELESSERT, RELEASE AND REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF 
WAR AT THE END OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES 151 (1977). 
 53. See id. at 151–56 (describing Soviet atrocities). 
 54. See TOLSTOY, supra note 50, at 20–21 (detailing British post-war practice). 
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mistreatment.  This need was augmented by the large number of displaced 
and stateless people in Europe after the War.  But States resisted 
recognition of an absolute duty to grant safe haven to threatened aliens.  
States wished to retain the right to use admission and expulsion of aliens for 
a range of policy purposes, including protecting the population from the 
threat posed by dangerous aliens, and would not agree to non-refoulement 
protection that did not prioritize their security concerns.55
States negotiating the Third Geneva Convention (3rd GC), regulating 
treatment of prisoners of war (POW), or captured combatants in 
international armed conflict, rejected formal restrictions on transfer based 
on fears of mistreatment.
  Thus, treaties 
negotiated in the immediate aftermath of World War II limited State 
obligations to retain aliens to situations where the alien did not pose a risk 
to security. 
56  A proposal to allow POW “to apply for their 
transfer to any other country which is ready to accept them,” was rejected 
by States in large part out of concern about the imposition of a duty to 
accept POW who feared repatriation.57  Instead, the 3rd GC includes an 
absolute obligation to release and repatriate POWs at the end of 
hostilities.58
Nevertheless, State practice since 1949 reflects a general unwillingness, 
at least in the West, to return prisoners to face mistreatment.  After the 
Korean War, U.N. forces, led by the United States, resisted Soviet, Chinese, 
and North Korean demands that prisoners who feared post-transfer 
treatment be forcibly repatriated to the North, resettling some prisoners in 
South Korea and the United States instead.
 
59  Similar practices followed the 
Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, and the wars in the former Yugoslavia.60  
This practice has led Theodor Meron to argue prisoners now have the “right 
of free choice” with respect to post-conflict repatriation, albeit one 
conditioned on the consent of States to accept POWs for resettlement.61
The Fourth Geneva Convention (4th GC) leans farther forward, 
restricting States from transferring protected persons, who are civilians in 
occupied territory or in the territory of a Party to an armed conflict, to face 
persecution.  Article 45 of the 4th GC prohibits the transfer of protected 
 
 
 55. See Kathleen M. Keller, Note, A Comparative and International Law Perspective on 
the United States (Non) Compliance with its Duty of Non-Refoulement, 2 YALE H.R. & DEV. 
L.J. 183, 186 (1999) (contending purpose of exceptions was to strengthen norm of non-
refoulement by making compliance more “realistic”). 
 56. See INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY III:  GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO 
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 542 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without 
delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”). 
 59. See Jan P. Charmatz & Harold M. Wit, Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 
1949 Geneva Convention, 62 YALE L.J. 391, 391–94 (1953) (describing the struggle between 
the United States and Soviet Union over this issue). 
 60. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 
239, 256 (2000) (summarizing practice). 
 61. Id. 
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persons in the territory of a Party to the conflict “to a country where he or 
she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or 
religious beliefs.”62  But Article 45 allows transfer of “aliens in individual 
cases when State security demands such action.”63  The 4th GC also 
expressly refuses to allow fears of persecution to restrict extraditions for 
ordinary crimes conducted pursuant to treaties in place prior to the 
conflict.64
The 1950 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees (Refugee 
Convention) provides still more extensive non-refoulement protection for 
refugees, or non-nationals fleeing persecution in their home States.  Article 
33(1) prohibits States from expelling or returning a refugee “where his life 
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”
 
65  The initial 
draft of the Convention included no restrictions on this obligation.66  The 
British objected to the lack of a security exception in the draft provision, 
and together with the French proposed language retaining for the State the 
right to use admission and expulsion to protect security interests.67  Article 
33(2) denies non-refoulement protections to refugees if there are reasonable 
grounds for regarding the detainee as “a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment 
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of 
that country.”68  Like the other post-War non-refoulement provisions, this 
one is generally interpreted as granting States an absolute right to expel 
refugees who fall within Article 33(2).69
 
 62. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
art. 45, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 4th GC]. 
 
 63. INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY  IV:  GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO 
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 266 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronad Griffin 
& C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958) (explaining that Article 45 does not restrict expulsions of 
“undesirable foreigner[s]” from State territory). 
 64. 4th GC, supra note 62, art. 45 (“The provisions of this Article do not constitute an 
obstacle to the extradition, in pursuance of extradition treaties concluded before the outbreak 
of hostilities, of protected persons accused of offences against ordinary criminal law.”). 
 65. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(1), July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
 66. PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951:  THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES 
ANALYSED, WITH A COMMENTARY 325 (Julian Weis ed., 1995). 
 67. Id. at 328. 
 68. Refugee Convention, supra note 65, art. 33(2).  Article 1(F) of the Refugee 
Convention exempts from refugee protection individuals who have committed war crimes, 
crimes against the peace, serious non-political crimes, or acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations outside the country of refuge. Id. art. 1(F).  The purpose of 
this provision was to ensure that individuals who do not deserve protection based on their 
past conduct do not abuse the refugee system. See WEIS, supra note 66, at xiii.  Individuals 
falling into these categories may additionally pose a threat to the security of the State where 
they are present, making security a secondary benefit of these restrictions. 
 69. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425–28 (1999) (explicitly rejecting 
balancing test proposed by UNHCR); Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs 
(1995) 62 FCR 556, 563 (Austl.) (“There is no obligation under the Convention . . . to weigh 
up the degree of seriousness of a serious crime against the possible harm to the 
applicant . . . .”); Malouf v. Canada, [1995] 190 N.R. 230, 230 (Can. F.C.A.) (holding 
Article 1(F) does not require balancing “the seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct against 
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While these post-war instruments viewed non-refoulement protection as 
a stand-alone right limited by security considerations, the European 
Commission on Human Rights (Commission), a human rights expert body 
with responsibility for determining which cases would be heard by the 
ECtHR, concluded in the 1960s that this protection was a manifestation of 
the broader prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment 
found in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.70
The ECtHR formally adopted the Commission’s interpretation of ECHR 
Article 3 in its decisions in Soering v. United Kingdom
  The 
Commission provided little justification for its interpretation of the ECHR.  
But this shift in conception was important because the prohibition on torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment is absolute under human rights law.  
By categorizing non-refoulement as a manifestation of these absolute rights, 
the legal status of the security exceptions to this duty was drawn into 
question. 
71 and Chahal v. 
United Kingdom.72  Article 3 prohibits State Parties from engaging in 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment under any circumstances, but 
contains no express restrictions on transfer.73  In Soering the court held that 
Article 3 includes an implied obligation for State Parties not to extradite an 
individual to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing the 
person will be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment after 
transfer.74  While the court acknowledged that there was no such express 
requirement in the treaty, it noted that the object and purpose of the treaty is 
to protect human rights and to “promote the ideals and values of a 
democratic society.”75
 
the alleged fear of persecution”); S. v Refugee Status Appeals Authority [1998] 2 NZLR 301 
(HC) 314–19 (agreeing with Malouf), aff’d, [1998] 2 NZLR 291 (CA); T v. Sec’y of State 
for the Home Dep’t, [1996] A.C. 742 (H.L.) 769 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Mustill, L.J.) 
(holding application of Article 1(F) “cannot depend on the consequences which the offender 
may afterwards suffer if he is returned”). But see U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (HCR), 
Guidelines on International Protection:  Application of the Exclusion Clauses:  Article 1F of 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05 
(Sept. 4, 2003) (arguing that gravity of the “non-political crime” that merits exclusion must 
be weighed against the “consequences of the exclusion”); Letter from Thomas Albrecht, 
Deputy Regional Representative, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, to Paul Engelmayer, 
WilmerHale (Jan. 6, 2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/43de2da94.pdf 
(explaining that Article 33(2) allows refoulement only where the gravity of danger posed by 
the individual outweighs the degree of persecution feared after return). 
  The court asserted without reasoning that it would 
be incompatible with these purposes to allow extradition where the 
 70. See X v. Fed. Republic of Ger., App. No. 1802/62, 1963 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
462, 478, 480 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) (holding that extradition can amount to conduct that 
violates Article 3 where person is subject to post-transfer torture or other treatment contrary 
to Article 3); see also Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10479/83, 37 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158, 171–75 (1984) (same); Altun v. Fed. Republic of Ger., App. No. 
10308/83, 36 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 209, 231–34 (1983) (same). 
 71. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32–36 (1989). 
 72. 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1853. 
 73. ECHR, supra note 7, art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”). 
 74. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35–36. 
 75. Id. at 34. 
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individual faced the real risk of post-transfer torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment.76
In Chahal the court extended Soering by holding that the threat posed by 
the alien to the State where he is located is irrelevant to non-refoulement 
analysis.
 
77  In rejecting a request by the British for recognition of a national 
security exception to non-refoulement, the ECtHR relied on the fact that 
Article 3 included no national security exception.78  If Article 3 did not 
permit a State Party to torture for national security reasons, neither, the 
court reasoned, could non-refoulement be subject to security 
considerations.79  The court did not discuss whether identical interests were 
protected by the duties to avoid torturing and to protect from acts of torture 
committed by others.80  And no discussion was had of the risks to the 
human rights of the British people if Chahal were released within the 
United Kingdom.81
The HRC has used similar reasoning to conclude that Article 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides an 
absolute protection against transfer to face torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment.
 
82  In General Comment 31, the Committee went 
further and implied from ICCPR Article 2 a broader obligation not to 
transfer a person “where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 
6 and 7 of the Covenant,” without further defining the potential range of 
post-transfer risk that could limit transfer.83
 
 76. See id. at 34–35 (“Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to 
in the brief and general wording of Article 3, would plainly be contrary to the spirit and 
intendment of the Article . . . .”). 
  The HRC, like the ECtHR, 
paid no attention to potential differences between negative and positive 
State duties.  The HRC also did not address the impact of the rule on the 
State’s security interests. 
 77. See Chahal, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1855–56. 
 78. Id. at 1855. 
 79. See id. (“The prohibition provided by Article 3 against ill-treatment is equally 
absolute in expulsion cases.”). 
 80. See id. at 1853–56. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20:  Article 7 (Prohibition 
of Torture, or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21 (Oct. 3, 1992) [hereinafter General Comment No. 20] (“States parties must not 
expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or 
refoulement.”). 
 83. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80]:  The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 31].  Article 
6 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to life and includes restrictions on the death penalty. See 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].  Article 7 prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. Id. art. 7. 
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Unlike the ECHR and the ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT) includes an express non-refoulement provision.84  Sweden included 
what is now Article 3 in its initial draft of the treaty based on the 1960s and 
70s jurisprudence of the European Commission on Human Rights discussed 
above.85  This provision prohibits transfer of a person to another State 
“where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture,” and includes no express exceptions 
for state security concerns.86  Textually it is not certain that Article 3 allows 
for no security exceptions.  Article 2, which contains the negative duty not 
to torture, includes an express prohibition on justifications for torture, a 
prohibition not replicated in Article 3.87  This absence led the United 
Kingdom and Portugal, among other States, to argue that “it [was] by no 
means clear” that Article 3 was intended to be absolute.88
Nevertheless, the Committee Against Torture and other human rights 
actors interpret Article 3 as an absolute manifestation of the right to be free 
from torture based on the provision’s historical link to the ECHR.  The 
Committee Against Torture has repeatedly stated its view that Article 3 
does not allow for any exceptions.
 
89  Similarly, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Question of Torture has characterized Article 3 as 
absolute,90 viewing the absence of permissible exceptions as derivative of 
the absolute nature of the negative duty not to torture.91  None of these 
opinions addressed the feasibility of such an interpretation of the rule, nor 
its impact on State security.92
 
 84. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
 
 85. MANFRED NOWAK, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE:  A 
COMMENTARY 199–200 (2008). 
 86. CAT, supra note 84, art. 3(1). 
 87. Id. art. 2(2) (“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a 
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as 
a justification of torture.”). 
 88. See Observations, supra note 23, ¶ 26.5.  
 89. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Committee Against Torture:  Canada, ¶ 4(a), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/CAN (July 7, 2005) 
(describing non-refoulement protection of Article 3 as “absolute” and “not subject to any 
exception whatsoever”); see also NOWAK, supra note 85, at 147–48 (summarizing Committee 
Against Torture practice on this question). 
 90. See Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Question of Torture Submitted in Accordance with Comm’n Resolution 2002/38, 
Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 26(o), U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/2003/68 (Dec. 17, 2002) (by 
Theo van Boven) (“The principle of non-refoulement must be upheld in all circumstances 
irrespective of whether the individual concerned has committed crimes and the seriousness 
and nature of those crimes.”). 
 91. Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/59/234 (Sept. 1, 2004) 
(“The principle of non-refoulement is an inherent part of the overall absolute and imperative 
nature of the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment.”). 
 92. CAT non-refoulement protection, unlike the implied obligations in the ICCPR and 
ECHR, is limited to torture.  The Committee Against Torture has recognized that Article 3 
was specifically drafted not to extend non-refoulement protections to cruel, inhuman or 
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With these developments in human rights law, the law lurched from 
categorically preferring State security interests to a similar preference for 
the rights of the transferee.  Many scholars have argued that that these 
developments in human rights law have rendered the security exception in 
the Refugee Convention “superfluous.”93
Human rights advocates and some States next appear determined to 
expand the categories of post-transfer mistreatment subject to non-
refoulement protection.  The International Convention for the Protection of 
all Persons from Enforced Disappearance includes an obligation not to 
transfer someone to a State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing he will be subjected to enforced disappearance.
  In the process, States have lost 
the ability to use admission and expulsion to protect the public from the 
threats posed by dangerous aliens who come from States with poor human 
rights records. 
94  The Committee 
on the Rights of the Child has interpreted the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child to include an open-ended obligation not to transfer children 
“where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of 
irreparable harm to the child.”95  The Committee suggested that a wide-
range of potential post-transfer problems should preclude transfer, including 
inadequate access to food or health care services and real risk of underage 
recruitment for sexual abuse or military service.96  Other human rights 
bodies have suggested non-refoulement protection should accompany risk 
of unfair trial.97
 
degrading treatment. See NOWAK, supra note 
  In all of these instances, it appears these new protections 
would not include exceptions for security considerations, thereby further 
restricting the right of the State to determine whether dangerous aliens may 
be admitted to or expelled from its territory. 
85, at 200 (summarizing Committee Against 
Torture views to this end). 
 93. See William A. Schabas, Non-Refoulement, in Expert Workshop on Human Rights 
and International Co-operation in Counter-terrorism, Triesenberg, Liechtenstein, Nov. 15–
17, 2006, Final Report, ¶¶ 20, 23, U.N. Doc. ODIHR.GAL/14/07 (Feb. 21, 2007) 
(summarizing support for this position). But see James C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, 
Framing Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257, 316–18 
(2001) (arguing that refugee status has important benefits not provided by non-refoulement 
protection in human rights law). 
 94. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, art. 16(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Jan. 12, 2007) (“No 
State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’), surrender or extradite a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being 
subjected to enforced disappearance.”). 
 95. U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General Comment No. 6:  Treatment 
of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/GC/2005/6 (Sept. 1, 2005). 
 96. Id. ¶¶ 27–28. 
 97. See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, SUBMISSION ON THE 3RD PERIODIC REPORT OF 
SWITZERLAND TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. 3 & n.7 (2009), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/ICJ_Switzerland97.pdf (summarizing 
international organization support for this view). 
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B.  Terrorism Raises the Stakes 
Throughout this evolution toward greater State non-refoulement duties, 
States have raised security considerations as an argument against further 
expansion.  In treaty negotiations dating back to the Refugee Convention, 
States have argued that security concerns were a legitimate excuse to non-
refoulement protection.98  In the drafting of the ICCPR, States rejected a 
proposal limiting expulsion of aliens to situations where the alien had been 
convicted of one of a list of criminal offenses.99  The reason was the desire 
of States to maintain their plenary control over admission of aliens into 
their territory.100  Similar rationale led the United States to argue against 
including non-refoulement protection from cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment in the CAT.101  And in Soering and Chahal, the United Kingdom 
vigorously opposed reading ECHR Article 3 to include absolute non-
refoulement protection.102
Nevertheless, the unique security concerns created by the modern threat 
of terrorism have heightened worries about the impact of non-refoulement 
protection on state security.  Not surprisingly, States are more concerned 
when non-refoulement prevents the repatriation of an alien intent on 
inflicting massive civilian casualties.  Given the magnitude of potential 
harm involved in a terrorist attack, States wish to be able to use the most 
powerful tools available to combat the threat. 
 
States value repatriation of aliens as a security tool because of the general 
ease with which repatriation may be achieved.  Substantively, human rights 
law only requires that the expulsion decision not be arbitrary, meaning that 
the decision is based on the law.103  The ICCPR also requires expulsion to 
be undertaken consistent with other provisions of the Covenant.104  
Procedurally, human rights law only requires that the alien be allowed to 
submit the reasons against expulsion to a competent authority that need not 
be a court;105 to appeal to a higher authority that need not be a court;106 and 
to be represented during expulsion proceedings.107
 
 98. See supra notes 
 
55–59 and accompanying text. 
 99. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:  CCPR 
COMMENTARY 291 & n.5 (2d rev. ed. 2005). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See NOWAK, supra note 85, at 200. 
 102. See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text. 
 103. Customary international law requires that States have some justification for 
expulsion. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 42, at 944.  Major human rights 
treaties all include the requirement that aliens be expelled only in accordance with law. See 
ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 13 (permitting expulsion “only in pursuance of a decision 
reached in accordance with the law”); Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as Amended by Protocol No. 11, art. 1, Nov. 1, 
1998, E.T.S. No. 117 [hereinafter ECHR Protocol 7] (same); American Convention on 
Human Rights art. 22(6), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 
1978) [hereinafter American Convention] (same); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, art. 12(4), June 27, 1981), 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter] (same). 
 104. NOWAK, supra note 99, at 295.  This means, for example, that the statute cannot 
discriminate impermissibly, such as by targeting a particular ethnic group, and cannot call 
for collective expulsions. 
 105. ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 13; ECHR Protocol 7, supra note 103, art. 1(a). 
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These procedural requirements are subject to waiver in compelling cases 
of national security.108  In its communication regarding the case of Karker 
v. France, the HRC upheld the decision of France to forego providing 
Karker with process prior to expulsion in a case where the French 
government sought expulsion because it feared he was involved with an 
Islamic extremist organization.109
Expulsion is important because States often are left without any viable 
alternative to mitigate the threat when it is not available.  Contrary to the 
suggestions of many writers,
 
110 prosecution is frequently unavailable 
because of significant substantive and procedural hurdles.111
Evidentiary problems are part of the reason why.  State evidence in 
terrorism cases often consists of intelligence information.
 
112  To be 
admitted in criminal trials, this intelligence information must be admissible 
under local evidentiary rules, which is sometimes entirely impossible.113  
The United Kingdom, for example, will not accept electronic intercepts as 
evidence in a criminal trial, meaning strong evidence as to the intent and 
plans of the defendant will not go in front of the fact-finder.114  Even where 
evidence is admissible, States may have real difficulty exposing that 
evidence to the requirement of confrontation without revealing the sources 
and methods used to collect the evidence.115
 
 106. ICCPR, supra note 
  In the United States, where 
83, art. 13; ECHR Protocol 7, supra note 103, art. 1(b)–(c). 
 107. ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 13. 
 108. Id.; ECHR Protocol 7, supra note 103, art. 1 (“An alien may be expelled before 
[procedural rights are provided] when such expulsion is necessary in the interests of public 
order or is grounded on reasons of national security.”). 
 109. See Karker v. France, U.N. Human Rights Comm. (CCPR), No. 833/1998, 
Conclusions Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/70/D/833/1998 (2000) (finding no violation of Article 
13). 
 110. See, e.g., Rene Bruin & Kees Wouters, Terrorism and the Non-Derogability of Non-
Refoulement, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 5, 28 (2003) (arguing prosecutions of terror suspects 
alleviate need for refoulement for security reasons); cf. RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. 
BENJAMIN JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:  PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS (2008) (arguing that federal courts can meet most, if not all, of the detention needs 
of the United States in the conflict with al Qaida). 
 111. See infra notes 112–23 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Jack Goldsmith, Long Term Terrorist Detention and Our National Security 
Court 4 (Brookings Inst., Working Paper of the Series on Counterterrorism and American 
Statutory Law, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0209_
detention_goldsmith/0209_detention_goldsmith.pdf. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 17 (U.K.) (prohibiting 
any evidence in a criminal proceeding that discloses information from electronic intercepts).  
Efforts to revise the intercept ban in a way that both protects national security and the right 
to a fair trial have failed to date. See LORD CARLILE OF BERRIEW, FIFTH REPORT OF THE 
INDEPENDENT REVIEWER PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(3) OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM 
ACT 2005 21–24 (Feb. 1, 2010) (quoting testimony from Secretary of State for the Home 
Department Alan Johnson on the failure of efforts to revise evidentiary rules to allow for 
admission of evidence based on intercepts). 
 115. See ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 14(3)(e) (granting all criminal suspects the right “[t]o 
examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him”); ECHR, supra note 7, art. 6(3)(d) 
(same); see also American Convention, supra note 103, art. 8(2)(f) (granting all criminal 
suspects the right “to examine witnesses present in the court”). 
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criminal defendants have a constitutional confrontation right, the need to 
subject all evidence to confrontation has derailed prosecutions out of fear of 
compromising intelligence sources.116
There must also be a sufficient quantum of evidence to meet the high 
burden of proof that exists in criminal trials.  Terrorism investigations often 
require action before the plot is completed in order to avoid risks to 
innocent lives.  But the imperative for action can conflict with the need to 
collect evidence to meet the burden of proof.  In the Naseer case, the threat 
that the media would reveal the existence of an investigation compelled the 
police to act before the plan to blow up a shopping mall had progressed to a 
stage where the police could collect enough evidence to prove a crime had 
been committed under British law.
 
117  The need for early action also means 
that detention may occur before the defendant is deemed to have committed 
a criminal offense already in the laws of the State at the time the illegal 
conduct occurred.118
Non-evidentiary problems exist as well.  Criminal offenses sometimes 
fail to capture the conduct that is worrisome to the State.  In Saadi v. 
Italy,
  This requirement can impede prosecution of terror 
suspects. 
119 the Italian government had admissible evidence that the defendant 
was in communication with Islamic extremists about plans to attack 
unspecified targets in Europe.120  While the government charged Saadi with 
conspiracy to commit terrorism, the court reduced the charge because under 
Italian law, terrorism requires proof that the target of the attack is not a 
participant in an armed conflict.121  The Italians lacked specific enough 
evidence of the planned targets for the attack to make a terrorism case.122
Prosecution is also less likely to mitigate permanently the threat the alien 
poses to the host State.  The issue of incapacitation arises again at the 
completion of the sentence, except where a life sentence or death is 
imposed.  Italian courts convicted Saadi of forgery, and he served a four 
and a half year sentence, but Italy was again confronted with how to 
 
 
 116. See Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution and the Preventive 
Detention Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 708 (2009) (discussing confrontation clause 
problems that may arise in terrorism prosecutions). But see United States v. Moussaoui, 382 
F.3d 453, 476 (4th Cir. 2004) (allowing the government wide latitude to substitute 
unclassified material for requested witness testimony the court believed was material to 
defendant’s case). 
 117. See Burns, supra note 1 (explaining that accelerated schedule for raids resulted in 
prosecution problems). 
 118. ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 15 (1); ECHR, supra note 7, art. 7(1); see also American 
Convention, supra note 103, art. 9. 
 119. App. No. 37201/06, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 730 (2008). 
 120. See id. at 736. 
 121. See id. at 734–35. 
 122. See id. (describing judgment of Assize Court dismissing terrorism charges because 
“it was not known whether the violent acts which the applicant and his accomplices were 
preparing to commit . . . were to be part of an armed conflict or not”). 
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mitigate his threat at the end of the sentence.123  By contrast, once 
repatriated an alien may be restricted from further access to the State.124
These difficulties with criminal prosecution have led many scholars,
 
125 
and some States,126
First, administrative detention is not permitted under some human rights 
instruments, except in exceptional circumstances. The ECHR has been 
interpreted to prohibit administrative detention for security purposes,
 to suggest that administrative detention, or detention 
based on the future dangerousness of a terrorist suspect, be made available.  
But States may find administrative detention an unappealing alternative to 
repatriation of aliens for at least three reasons. 
127 
except where the requirements for derogation are met.128
Second, while expulsion is by definition limited to aliens, it is difficult to 
similarly cabin administrative detention to a particular population or type of 
conduct.  In A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
 
129 the British 
House of Lords struck down an immigration law permitting indefinite 
detention pending deportation where the Secretary of State certifies that the 
alien is a suspected terrorist, and that his presence threatens the national 
security of the United Kingdom.130  Because the ECHR does not permit 
indefinite administrative detention pending deportation,131
 
 123. See id. at 734. 
 the British 
 124. See, e.g., Joel Brinkley, From Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, via Guantánamo, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A4 (noting that Yaser E. Hamdi was required to “renounce his 
American citizenship” as a condition of his repatriation to Saudi Arabia after the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted him the right to challenge his detention in court). 
 125. See Goldsmith, supra note 112, at 4–5 (arguing in favor of administrative detention 
where criminal prosecution is not possible). See generally Monica Hakimi, International 
Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects:  Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict Criminal 
Divide, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 369 (2008) (arguing that administrative detention is a tool for 
combating terrorism consistent with human rights law). 
 126. In his speech at the National Archives in May 2009, President Obama argued that 
the United States needed to consider new detention authority to prevent the “release [of] 
individuals who endanger the American people.” President Barack Obama, Remarks by the 
President on National Security (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-
Security-5-21-09/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).  To that end Obama proposed that Congress 
authorize a legal regime that would allow for detention without criminal charge, but with 
legal process including periodic review. Id.  To date nothing has come of the Obama 
proposal. 
 127. See Hakimi, supra note 125, at 392 (summarizing ECtHR jurisprudence interpreting 
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights). 
 128. See Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 48 (1961) (upholding Irish 
law allowing for security detention without trial based on proper invocation of Article 15 
derogation from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights).  Article 15 allows 
for derogation “[i]n time of war or other public emergency [that] threaten[s] the life of the 
nation.” ECHR, supra note 7, art. 15.  It is doubtful that all conflicts with non-State actors 
that are the subject of this Article would meet this standard. 
 129.  [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 130. See id. at [73]; see also Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 23 
(U.K.) (granting government the power to detain “suspected international terrorist[s]” 
indefinitely pending deportation where non-refoulement prevents actual expulsion). 
 131. See ECHR, supra note 7, art. 5(1)(f) (“No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in 
the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:  the lawful arrest 
or detention of a person . . . against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
2011] TO TRANSFER OR NOT TO TRANSFER 93 
attempted to derogate from Article 5.132  The Law Lords rejected the 
derogation because they did not believe the immigration provision was 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.133  The Lords refused to 
accept indefinite detention pending deportation because British nationals 
suspected of terrorism were subjected to less restrictive means, such as 
monitoring and restrictions on movement, to manage their threat.134  The 
difficulty in cabining administrative detention has led many human rights 
advocates to oppose the scheme on grounds it will displace criminal 
prosecution over time.135
Third, even the more lenient procedural requirements for administrative 
detention may be too onerous to meet.  For example, unlike expulsion, the 
procedural requirements for administrative detention are not subject to 
security waiver, unless the conditions for derogation from human rights 
obligations exist.
 
136
Thus, without repatriation States may be left with no way to physically 
counteract the threat posed by a dangerous alien.  Human rights groups and 
scholars have suggested third country resettlement as the solution to the 
problems created by non-refoulement protection.
 
137  However, recent 
attempts to repatriate detainees from Guantanamo Bay demonstrate the 
futility of depending upon States to accept non-nationals for resettlement, 
especially where the detainee is believed to be dangerous.138
 
extradition.”); see also R v. Governor of Durham Prison (Ex parte Hardial Singh), (1984) 1 
W.L.R. 704 (Q.B.) at 706 (Eng.) (interpreting Article 5 as permitting detention only for so 
long as “reasonably necessary” to effect deportation). 
  It is difficult 
to conceive of the incentives for a State to accept potentially dangerous 
aliens for resettlement.  States motivated to accept such aliens on 
humanitarian grounds may be dissuaded by diplomatic pressure from the 
 132. See A, [2004] UKHL at [11] (describing derogation order). 
 133. Id. at [44]. 
 134. Id. at [35], [44], [155]. 
 135. See generally Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism:  An Abundant 
Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 499 (2005). 
 136. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 9. 
 137. See, e.g., Gillard, supra note 37, at 738 (arguing third country resettlement is 
solution to security problems created by non-refoulement); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-
FATED HOMECOMINGS:  A TUNISIAN CASE STUDY OF GUANTANAMO REPATRIATIONS 27 (2007) 
(calling on Bush Administration to close Guantanamo detention facility through third 
country resettlement). 
 138. See Dan Ephron, Life After Gitmo, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 25, 2008, 7:00 PM) 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/11/25/life-after-gitmo.html (interviewing 
author on difficulties of third country resettlement from Guantanamo).  The Obama 
Administration has resettled more detainees in third countries, but has not found homes for 
all of the detainees who cannot be repatriated to their home countries. See Peter Finn, Wolf 
Criticizes Counterterrorism Nominee over Detainee-Resettlement Plans, WASH. POST., July 
15, 2011, at A7 (noting that “[t]he Obama Administration has repatriated or resettled in third 
countries 67 detainees”); The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees (last visited Sept. 21, 2011) (reporting 
171 detainees remain at Guantanamo Bay). 
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State of nationality of the alien.139
Thus, removing repatriation from the table often leaves States resorting 
to measures like control orders to mitigate the risk posed by dangerous 
aliens.  Control orders are parole-like restrictions imposed on a terrorism 
suspect in order to protect the public from the suspect.  The United 
Kingdom authorized a system of control orders in the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act of 2005,
  States already reluctant to take such a 
step do not need much diplomatic arm-twisting to decline to do so. 
140 and they have been used by other States as 
well.141  Restrictions imposed include curfews, restrictions on 
communication and travel, and the right of the police to search the suspect’s 
premises on demand.142
Despite the potential of control orders, they have proven ineffective, at 
least in the United Kingdom.  HMG has found it difficult to design lawful 
control orders because of the numerous restrictions imposed by the ECHR.  
Control orders must not be so onerous as to amount to a deprivation of 
liberty without derogation from the ECHR.
 
143  And they may only be 
imposed if the terrorism suspect is provided “knowledge of the essence of 
the case against him,”144 requiring the State to rely on information it can 
share with the suspect.  These restrictions have led HMG to question 
whether control orders provide any practical advantages to national 
security.145  Forty-five individuals since 2005 have been subjected to 
control orders, with seven individuals having absconded, and six more 
having their control orders quashed by the courts.146  Former Home Office 
Secretary Tony McNulty acknowledged the limited efficacy of control 
orders, calling them “a second best option” to protect the public.147
Thus, the threat of terrorist acts perpetrated by aliens increases the 
security consequences of granting non-refoulement protection.  When aliens 
may not be repatriated, detention, whether criminal, pursuant to ongoing 
 
 
 139. See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes, Palau Deal May Not End Uighur Issue, L.A. TIMES, June 
11, 2009, at A16 (reporting that China had “pressured other countries not to take the 
Uighurs”).  
 140. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 1(1) (U.K.) (“‘[C]ontrol order’ means 
an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with 
protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.”). 
 141. See COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., PROMISES TO KEEP:  DIPLOMATIC 
ASSURANCES AGAINST TORTURE IN U.S. TERRORISM TRANSFERS 91 (2010) (detailing 
Canada’s use of similar measures). 
 142. See Prevention of Terrorism Act § 1(4) (listing potential restrictions imposed by 
control orders). 
 143. For example, HMG may impose a curfew of up to sixteen hours per day, but no 
longer. See Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t. v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, [105] (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (describing it as “clear” that curfews up to 16 hours are compatible with Article 
5, while those longer than 16 hours are not). 
 144. See Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t. v. AF, [2009] UKHL 28, [65] (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (interpreting ECtHR decision in A v. United Kingdom). 
 145. CARLILE, supra note 114, at 63–64 (reprinting letter from Home Secretary to Lord 
Carlile requesting consideration of whether control orders had use after AF). 
 146. Id. at 6–8. 
 147. PM Hits Back over Terror Suspect Escapes, POLITICS.CO.UK (Oct. 17, 2006, 12:00 
AM), http://www.politics.co.uk/News/domestic-policy/crime/terrorism/control-orders-
reviewed-after-terror-suspects-escape-$454849.htm. 
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immigration proceedings, or preventive, may not be available.148  Third 
country resettlement and release with conditions may also be unachievable 
or ineffective alternatives.149
Of course, this result merely places aliens in the same situation as citizen 
terrorist suspects.  As discussed above, the Law Lords in A saw no 
legitimate reason for treating aliens differently from citizens in this 
regard.
   
150
C.  States Push Back 
  What the Law Lords overlook, however, is that aliens, unlike 
citizens, have no legal right to remain within the State.  While States 
grudgingly accept the threat posed by nationals as a price for maintaining 
cherished civil liberties, such a price is far steeper where the individual in 
question has traditionally been removable from the State.  Indeed, the 
magnitude of the threat involved with acts of terrorism makes it difficult for 
States to bear additional risk to protect dangerous aliens.  Because 
international law largely depends upon voluntary compliance, States have 
many options to evade disfavored rules, as will be described in the next 
section. 
Given the security problems created through enforcement of the non-
refoulement rule, it is not surprising that States have sought to mitigate the 
resulting security consequences.  They have done so in part by pushing 
human rights bodies to accept the right of States to expel aliens despite the 
threat of post-transfer mistreatment where the alien threatens State 
security.151  These efforts have been unsuccessful.  Human rights 
institutions view non-refoulement as a bulwark against erosion of the jus 
cogens torture norm and are skeptical of the ability of human rights law to 
account for State security interests.152  With the current rule entrenched, 
some States have taken steps to protect their security interests that are 
inconsistent with the spirit or even letter of human rights law, moves which 
are ultimately harmful to human rights.153
States long have resisted embracing the full import of non-refoulement 
protections where difficult security consequences result.  For example, the 
United States takes the position that only express treaty obligations can 
confer non-refoulement rights, rejecting the implication of such duties from 
more general treaty provisions.  This position means the United States does 
not recognize a non-refoulement obligation with respect to transfers to 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or other lesser forms of 
mistreatment.
 
154
 
 148. See supra notes 
  The United States also rejects the Committee Against 
110–34 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
 150. See A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, [44] (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (striking down British preventive detention law targeting alien terrorist suspects 
on grounds that it was unreasonable to treat alien and citizen terrorist suspects differently). 
 151. See infra notes 154–71 and accompanying text. 
 152. See infra notes 179–82 and accompanying text. 
 153. See infra notes 183–203 and accompanying text. 
 154. The United States rejected the HRC’s interpretation of ICCPR Article 7.  In support 
of its view it explained that the vigorous debate over the later-in-time, narrower non-
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Torture’s view that CAT Article 3 applies to transfers not originating in the 
United States.155
The aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks has intensified efforts by other 
States to seek modifications to the non-refoulement rule.  These efforts 
have generally been rebuffed by the human rights apparatus.  Several 
European States, including the United Kingdom and Portugal, sought 
reconsideration of the ECtHR ruling in Chahal that there were no security 
exceptions to the non-refoulement rule in Saadi.
  The U.S. positions on these issues are offered as technical 
disagreements with the human rights community about negotiating history 
and methods of interpretation of treaty provisions, consistent with the 
positivist approach to international law employed by the United States.  But 
the security considerations of accepting broader non-refoulement 
obligations are a prime policy motivation for the U.S. position. 
156  Italy had evidence that 
Saadi was connected with Islamic terrorists, and sought to deport him home 
to Tunisia after he completed his criminal sentence in Italy.157  Saadi 
argued that his deportation to Tunisia would violate Article 3 of the ECHR 
because of the real risk he would be tortured after his return.158  The United 
Kingdom intervened, arguing that Chahal wrongly ignored the obligation of 
States to protect their population from the threat posed by terrorists.159  
Instead, HMG submitted that the court permit States to weigh the threat 
posed by the person being transferred in its non-refoulement assessment, 
perhaps by raising the threshold of evidence of mistreatment that must be 
demonstrated in cases where the individual poses a real threat to the State 
where he is located.160
The ECtHR in Saadi fully affirmed its decision in Chahal.  After noting 
the real threat terrorism posed to state security, the court repeated the 
simple premise that underlies Chahal:  since ECHR Article 3 provides an 
 
 
refoulement obligation in the CAT demonstrated that the ICCPR did not already include a 
broad obligation in the area. See U.S. Dep’t of State, List of Issues to Be Taken Up in 
Connection with the Consideration of the Second and Third Periodic Reports of the United 
States of America 17–19, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/AdvanceDocs/
USA-writtenreplies.pdf. 
 155. The United States argues the CAT Article 3 lacks the clear indicia of extraterritorial 
application included in other provisions of the treaty. See U.S. Dep’t of State, List of Issues 
to Be Considered During the Examination of the Second Periodic Report of the United States 
of America:  Response of the United States of America 34, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/124126.pdf.  The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted this for an 
identical term in the Refugee Convention. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 
179 (1993) (holding that the “text and negotiating history of Article 33 [of the Refugee 
Convention] affirmatively indicate that it was not intended to have extraterritorial effect”). 
 156. 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 730 (2009).  The brief calling for overruling Chahal was initially 
filed in Ramzy v. Netherlands, but the arguments were later made in Saadi because that case 
came in front of the ECtHR first. See generally Observations, supra note 23.  
 157. See Saadi, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 734–37.  Italy had charged Saadi with conspiracy to 
commit acts of terrorism, but the trial court rejected that charge. See id. at 734.  Under Italian 
law terrorism requires proof that the target of the planned violence is not a participant in an 
armed conflict, and the government introduced insufficient evidence regarding the target of 
the plan to prove this point. See id. at 734–35. 
 158. See id. at 752–53. 
 159. See id. at 756–57. 
 160. See id. at 757–58. 
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absolute prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment by 
State Parties, non-refoulement protection must also be absolute.161  No 
consideration may be made of any factors not related to threat of post-
transfer mistreatment.  Because the threat the detainee poses to the State 
that seeks expulsion does not affect the risk of mistreatment after transfer, 
the ECtHR held that this factor may not be considered.162
Canada, by contrast, has gained some traction with the Canadian 
Supreme Court with the argument that its security interests are relevant to 
the determination of whether to provide non-refoulement protection.  
Canadian immigration law permits deportation “to a country where a 
person’s life or freedom would be threatened” based on a determination that 
a person “constitutes a danger to the security of Canada.”
 
163  In Suresh v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration),164 Canada sought to 
deport Suresh to his native Sri Lanka because his involvement in the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist group seeking an 
independent Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka, threatened the security of 
Canada.165  Suresh sought to block his deportation on grounds that he faced 
torture if returned to Sri Lanka because of his affiliation with the LTTE.166  
Suresh argued that deportation where substantial risk of torture exists 
violates the right to life protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.167
The Canadian Supreme Court held that the Canadian Charter permitted 
balancing the State’s interest in combating terrorism against Suresh’s 
constitutional right not be transferred to face torture.
 
168
 
 161. See id. at 761 (“Since protection against the treatment prohibited by art. 3 is 
absolute, that provision imposes a[] [non-refoulement] obligation . . . [for] any person who, 
in the receiving country, would run the real risk of being subjected to such treatment.”). 
  While the court 
recognized that “barring extraordinary circumstances, deportation to 
torture” was impermissible, it refused to exclude the possibility that such 
 162. See id.  (“The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the community if not 
returned does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill treatment . . . .”). 
 163. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, § 53 (Can.) (“[No person] . . . shall be 
removed from Canada to a country where the [person’s] life or freedom is threatened . . . 
unless . . . the person is [reasonably believed to be engaged in terrorism or part of an 
organization engaged in terrorism] and the Minister is of the opinion that the person 
constitutes a danger to the security of Canada.”), repealed and replaced by Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (effective June 28, 2002).  A person whose removal 
on June 28, 2002 was allowed by section 53(1)(a) to (d) of the former Immigration Act is a 
person referred to in section 115(2) of the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. See 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, § 326(3) (Can.). 
 164. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.). 
 165. See id. para. 1. 
 166. See id. paras. 15, 42. 
 167. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, pt. 1, § 7 (U.K.) (“Everyone has the right 
to life, liberty and the security of person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”). 
 168. See Suresh, 1 S.C.R., para. 58 (explaining that Canadian law balances the state’s 
interest in combating terrorism against its “constitutional commitment to liberty and fair 
process”). 
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circumstances existed.169  “The ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport 
to torture, if any,” the court explained, “must await future cases.”170  The 
court acknowledged that this decision was contrary to international law.171
Nevertheless, lower Canadian courts have yet to find “exceptional 
circumstances” where transfers are permitted despite the substantial risk of 
torture.  Courts have avoided reaching the balancing analysis in most cases, 
instead reversing the factual determinations underlying the government’s 
removal decision.
 
172
In the one case where the lower court has directly engaged in Suresh 
balancing, it refused to authorize deportation.  The lower court upheld the 
finding of the Canadian government that Mahmoud Es Sayyid Jaballah 
facilitated communications that assisted in the 1998 U.S. Embassy 
bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, trained in al Qaida camps, and was in 
active contact with senior al Qaida leaders in Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and Yemen.
   
173  But the Court refused to authorize his deportation to Egypt 
where there was a substantial risk of torture because his case did not rise to 
the level of “exceptional circumstances” mandated by Suresh.174  The Court 
believed such circumstances did not exist because Jaballah did not himself 
commit acts of violence.175
Despite the unwillingness of the lower Canadian courts to authorize 
deportation using the Suresh rule, the reaction of the human rights treaty 
bodies to the Suresh decision has been overwhelmingly negative.  In 2005, 
the HRC criticized the decision as a violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR.
 
176
[n]o person, without any exception, even those suspected of presenting a 
danger to national security or the safety of any person, and even during a 
state of emergency, may be deported to a country where he/she runs the 
risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.
  
In its concluding observations to Canada, the HRC wrote,  
177
That same year the Committee Against Torture specifically criticized 
Suresh, writing, “The Committee expresses its concern at:  [t]he failure of 
the Supreme Court of Canada, in [Suresh] . . . to recognize . . . the absolute 
 
 
 169. Id. para. 76. 
 170. Id. para. 78. 
 171. See id. para. 75 (“We conclude that . . .  international law rejects deportation to 
torture, even where national security interests are at stake.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2005] 3 
F.C.R. 334, para. 54 (Can.) (refusing to accept Immigration Ministry’s finding that Mahjoub 
posed a threat to Canada without evidence that the Minister had independently reviewed 
intelligence information, including source material). 
 173. See In re Jaballah, [2006] F.C. 1230, paras. 39–55 (Can.).   
 174. See id. paras. 81–84. 
 175. Id. paras. 81–82. 
 176. See U.N. Human Rights Comm. (CCPR), Report of the Human Rights Committee, 
para. 15, U.N. Doc. A/61/40 (2006). 
 177. Id. 
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nature of the protection of article 3 of the Convention, which is not subject 
to any exception whatsoever.”178
Similarly, the limited scholarship examining Suresh has criticized the 
decision for refusing to categorically exclude the possibility of transfer 
where the risk of torture exists.
 
179  This scholarship conflates non-
refoulement with the jus cogens duty not to torture, and therefore fears that 
Suresh undermines the anti-torture norm.180  Scholars have also been 
skeptical of the ability of the Canadian government to balance the relevant 
equities fairly, fearing that the government will prefer security interests to 
the human rights of the transferee, thereby expanding the exception.181  
This skepticism is fueled by the specter of extraordinary rendition, defined 
in this context as transfer for the purpose of interrogation using torture.182
Given the unwillingness of the human rights community and some States 
to reconsider the scope of non-refoulement protection, States have resorted 
to behavioral adaptations that have negative second-order human rights 
effects to avoid the security consequences of non-refoulement.  In some 
instances States have been unwilling to capture dangerous aliens out of fear 
that they could not be repatriated after capture.  European navies have 
released suspected pirates captured off the coast of Somalia back onto their 
ships or onto Somali beaches out of concern that they would be unable to 
repatriate them if taken prisoner because of torture concerns.
 
183  The British 
have gone further still and instructed their ships not to capture pirates at all, 
out of fear that they could claim the right to remain in the United Kingdom 
if brought onboard the ship or to British soil for trial.184
 
 178. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 19 of the Convention:  Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee 
Against Torture:  Canada, ¶ 4(a), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/CAN (July 7, 2005). 
  While these 
 179. See Kent Roach, Constitutional, Remedial and International Dialogues About 
Rights:  The Canadian Experience, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 537, 572 (2005) (arguing that it would 
have been preferable for the Canadian Supreme Court to follow established international 
law). 
 180. See Robert J. Currie, Charter Without Borders? The Supreme Court of Canada, 
Transnational Crime and Constitutional Rights and Freedoms, 27 DALHOUSIE L.J. 235, 259 
(2004) (arguing against distinction between negative obligation not to torture and non-
refoulement protection); David Jenkins, Rethinking Suresh:  Refoulement to Torture Under 
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 47 ALTA. L. REV. 125, 127 (2009) (criticizing 
Suresh for undermining “international peremptory norm against torture and the concomitant 
protective principle of non-refoulement”). 
 181. Currie, supra note 180, at 260 (criticizing balancing test for giving too much weight 
to security concerns); Jenkins, supra note 180, at 132–33 (raising concerns about willingness 
of Canadian government to expand Suresh to dangerous aliens not involved in terrorism). 
 182. Jenkins, supra note 180, at 151 (“[R]endition shows that the principle of non-
refoulement must be absolutely respected as an outgrowth of jus cogens, so that countries 
cannot unscrupulously avoid their obligation not to inflict torture directly by ‘shopping out’ 
or ‘out-sourcing’ the dirty work to other willing countries.”). 
 183. See Tullio Treves, Human Rights and the Law of the Sea, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 
13 (2010) (describing release of pirates by a Danish naval vessel due to non-refoulement 
concerns). 
 184. See Marie Woolf, Pirates Can Claim UK Asylum, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Apr. 13, 
2008, at 1 (explaining Foreign Office instruction to the Royal Navy).  Julian Brazier, 
Conservative MP, criticized the British policy to not capture pirates in Somalia, saying, 
100 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
policies protect the European public from the risk that captured pirates are 
freed in Europe, the significant costs of this decision are borne by 
merchants and ship crews plying the Red Sea, and Somalis terrorized by the 
released pirates back on shore. 
More perniciously, States have puffed the effectiveness of diplomatic 
assurances to argue that they may repatriate individuals consistent with 
their non-refoulement duties.185 Diplomatic assurances are promises 
obtained from the receiving State that they will not torture or otherwise 
mistreat detainees.186  Assurances are designed to reduce the risk of 
mistreatment such that transfer is still permissible under international 
law.187  Major European States, including the United Kingdom, Italy and 
Spain, as well as Canada and the United States, employ diplomatic 
assurances regularly.188
Generally these assurances are obtained from States with poor human 
rights records, which have a history of mistreating transferees.
 
189  Human 
rights groups are critical of diplomatic assurances because the States asked 
to give assurances have already violated international commitments not to 
mistreat their people.190  These groups ask why these bilateral promises are 
any more likely to be followed.  Advocates of assurances respond that 
promises from high-ranking foreign ministry or interior ministry officials to 
their U.S., Canadian, or European counterparts may influence the State’s 
behavior more than multilateral treaty commitments.191  In the past I have 
written that assurances can reduce the risk of post-transfer mistreatment 
where they are standardized, evaluated by appropriate country experts 
within a State’s foreign ministry, actively monitored, and accompanied by a 
political commitment to ensure that they are followed.192
 
“These people commit horrendous offences.  The solution is to turn them over to the local 
authorities.  It’s a pathetic indictment of our legal system.” Id. at 1. 
 
 185. The United Kingdom has actively promoted diplomatic assurances as an effective 
“way forward” to comply with non-refoulement while protecting its public. See JULIA HALL, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NOT THE WAY FORWARD:  THE UK’S DANGEROUS RELIANCE ON 
DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES 25–27 (Joanne Mariner et al. eds., 2008) (describing efforts by the 
British to convince other European states to embrace deportation with assurances). 
 186. See id. at 1. 
 187. The CAT, for example, permits transfers so long as there are not “substantial 
grounds” to believe the individual will be tortured. CAT, supra note 84, art. 3.  Assurances 
may allow the State to assess that there are no longer “substantial grounds” to believe the 
transferee will be tortured, even if the risk is greater than zero. See id. 
 188. JULIA HALL, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL AT RISK:  DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES NO 
SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE 3–4 (Rachel Denber et al. eds., 2005). 
 189. Id. at 18–19.  
 190. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE STAMP OF GUANTANAMO:  THE STORY OF 
SEVEN MEN BETRAYED BY RUSSIA’S DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES TO THE UNITED STATES (2007) 
(arguing that mistreatment of detainees after their transfer from Guantanamo Bay 
demonstrates ineffectiveness of diplomatic assurances). 
 191. John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in 
Contemporary Conflicts:  Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing 
Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 239 (2011). 
 192. See id. at 239–40.  For a comprehensive understanding of the difficult issues 
surrounding diplomatic assurances, see generally ASHLEY S. DEEKS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, AVOIDING TRANSFERS TO TORTURE (2008). 
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But the risks associated with providing non-refoulement protection 
motivate States to rely upon assurances they know are faulty.  A Columbia 
Law School Human Rights Institute report concluded that the United States 
is more likely to use assurances where it has no tenable alternatives to 
mitigate the threat posed by dangerous aliens.193  Take the case of Maher 
Arar, a Canadian-Syrian dual national, whom the United States suspected of 
involvement with al Qaida when it detained him at Kennedy Airport in 
2002.194  U.S. officials were reluctant to release Arar to Canada, his country 
of residence, because Canadian officials indicated they had no legal 
authority to detain him if he returned.  U.S. officials feared Arar would use 
the porous U.S.-Canadian border to re-enter the country to commit terrorist 
attacks.195  Rather than bear this risk, the United States decided to remove 
Arar to Syria, pursuant to an immigration law permitting fast-track removal 
of dangerous aliens.196  While that law prohibited transfer where it violated 
U.S. non-refoulement duties under the CAT, the United States claimed the 
transfer to Syria complied with this requirement, citing assurances received 
from the Syrian government.197  The United States credited these 
assurances despite Syria’s notorious history of torturing suspected Islamic 
radicals, and the poor state of U.S.-Syrian relations that made enforcing 
assurances difficult.198  Tragically, Arar was tortured by Syrian officials, 
and Canada subsequently cleared him of any involvement with radical 
Islamic groups.199
The Arar case is not unique.  In 2002, the United States deported 
suspected Islamic radical Nabil Soliman to Egypt.
 
200  His removal had been 
deferred for many years due to fears of post-transfer mistreatment, but in 
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that deferral was lifted on the basis of 
assurances from Egypt.201  Soliman was held incommunicado in Egypt for 
seven weeks after his return, and the U.S. Embassy in Cairo could not 
confirm that he had not been tortured.202  Similarly, the United Kingdom 
persisted with deporting terrorist suspects to Algeria pursuant to diplomatic 
assurances despite reports from detainees who had been repatriated 
previously that they had been tortured, dismissing those complaints as less 
reliable than promises from the Algerian government.203
 
 193. COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., supra note 
 
141, at 31. 
 194. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-08-18, 
THE REMOVAL OF A CANADIAN CITIZEN TO SYRIA 6 (2008). 
 195. See id. at 12, 21; see also Scott Shane, The Costs of Outsourcing Interrogation:  A 
Canadian Muslim’s Long Ordeal in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at 10 (quoting U.S. 
officials explaining they could not risk Arar’s release in Canada after the 9/11 attacks). 
 196. See Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(2) (2006) (permitting 
Attorney General to designate aliens for removal without proceedings in front of an 
immigration judge). 
 197. See Shane, supra note 195, at 10 (quoting testimony by former Attorney General 
John Ashcroft). 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See Soliman v. United States, 296 F.3d 1237, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 201. See id. at 1241–42 (summarizing facts in case). 
 202. COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., supra note 141, at 49. 
 203. See id. at 82–83 (detailing actions by HMG and SIAC in the case). 
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These cases reveal an important reality regarding non-refoulement 
protection.  Even as human rights bodies have held the line against any 
exceptions to the non-refoulement duty, States concerned about the security 
consequences of the rule found alternative methods to protect their 
population.  This result is not surprising; as Thomas Franck has explained, 
rules that produce outcomes at the margins that are viewed as unjust lose 
some of the legitimacy required to entice voluntary compliance.204
II.  DUTY TO PROTECT:  REFRAMING THE NON-REFOULEMENT DEBATE 
  But 
these State workarounds have important second-order negative 
repercussions for human rights, which raises questions about the 
desirability and viability of the current rule. 
A.  Understanding the Protection Competition 
The non-refoulement debate has reached an impasse.  From the 
perspective of human rights bodies, like the ECtHR in Saadi, non-
refoulement is inseparable from the right to be free from torture or cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment, which is absolute.205  Even if human 
rights law wanted to account for security interests, these are viewed as 
outside the ambit of human rights law.206  This leads to the accusation that 
seeking to balance individual rights with security interests in transfer 
assessments compares apples to oranges.207
This Article contends that this stand-off is due in significant part to a 
failure to appreciate the human rights competition at issue in transfer 
determinations regarding dangerous aliens.  The traditional conception of 
human rights is that they entail negative duties:  the State shall avoid 
actions that constitute a deprivation of the right.
  From the perspective of States, 
a human rights framework that fails to account for the fundamental 
obligation of States to secure the safety of their people is untenable, not the 
least because of political pressures to do so.  Because international law for 
the most part depends upon voluntary state enforcement, an untenable rule 
results in State evasion. 
208  U.S. domestic and 
international legal interpretation has generally viewed human rights in this 
way.209  In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services,210
 
 204. See FRANCK, supra note 
 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a claim that the State had a 
constitutional duty to protect a boy from abuse by his father when it knew 
41, at 84 (discussing compliance problems for “idiot rules”). 
 205. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra ntoes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
 207. See infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 208. See SHUE, supra note 33, at 35–36, 52–53. 
 209. Criminal law is a major exception, as U.S. law recognizes affirmative governmental 
duties to effectuate the right to a fair trial, such as government provision of counsel to the 
indigent. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment includes a government duty to provide counsel to the indigent for criminal 
trial). 
 210. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
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or should have known of the danger.211  The Court held that all due process 
requires is that the State not deprive an individual of a protected interest, 
not that it take any affirmative steps to prevent private deprivations of 
rights.212  This limited conception of rights is reflected in U.S. tort law by 
the public duty doctrine, which limits government liability for failure to 
protect to situations where the State itself created the danger at issue.213  
And it is espoused regularly by the United States in rejecting human rights 
that require the State to take positive fulfillment measures, such as most 
economic, social and cultural rights.214
Henry Shue’s important book Basic Rights,
 
215 however, rejects this 
limited American conception of rights.  He instead argues that fulfillment of 
basic rights requires positive action from States, including the duty to 
protect those within their jurisdictions from violations committed by 
others.216  Shue explains that it would make little sense to speak of a right 
to physical security, for example, if the State allowed others free reign to 
violate that security.217  Such a duty is in accordance with the 
understanding that a primary purpose of the State is to create the structures 
required to prevent one member of society or institution from harming 
another.218  Human rights bodies,219 treaties,220
 
 211. See id. at 191. 
 and most human rights 
 212. Id. at 195–96. 
 213. See Helen Gugel, Remaking the Mold:  Pursuing Failure to Protect Claims Under 
State Constitutions via Analogous Bivens Actions, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1294, 1312–13 
(2010) (describing impediment to right to protect claims under U.S. state tort law). 
 214. See, e.g., Tony P. Hall, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Agencies for Food and 
Agriculture, U.S. Opening Statement at the Food and Agriculture Organization Right to 
Food Forum (Oct. 1–3, 2008), http://www.fao.org/righttofood/rtf_forum/files/Right%
20to%20food%20statement.pdf (describing right to food as a “goal or aspiration” not giving 
rise to “any international obligation or domestic legal entitlement”). 
 215. See SHUE, supra note 33, at 52. 
 216. See id. at 37–40. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Id. at 56.  For a good primer on political theory supporting the view that protection 
of citizens is a primary purpose of the State, see generally Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty 
of Government:  Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 
(1991). 
 219. See Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 4, ¶ 172 (July 29, 1988) (holding that Article 1(1) of the American Convention 
includes a positive obligation “to prevent, investigate and punish” human rights violations 
committed by private actors); General Comment No. 31, supra note 83, ¶ 8 (expressing view 
that Article 2(1) of the ICCPR includes obligation “to take appropriate measures or to 
exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress” violations of the Covenant); 
A.R. MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2004) 
(explaining that ECtHR has recognized State “duties to protect persons from the violation of 
their Convention rights from both other private individuals and public officials”). 
 220. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, art. 2(d), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (“Each State Party shall prohibit 
and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by 
circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization.”). 
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scholars221
The duty to protect provides the intellectual architecture for non-
refoulement protection.
 accept that satisfying human rights obligations mandates 
protection against violations committed by actors other than the State. 
222  As discussed in the previous part, a major 
development in human rights law of the last thirty years has been 
recognition of an obligation not to transfer someone where there is a 
substantial risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment.223  While human rights bodies such as ECtHR and the HRC have 
failed to provide much in the way of meaningful analysis to justify 
implication of such a duty, especially in the face of evidence such 
protection was not contemplated during drafting, understanding non-
refoulement as a duty to protect provides the normative foundation for their 
interpretation.  The obligation not to torture or seriously mistreat imposes 
upon States a negative duty to avoid torturing or mistreating anyone.  But 
fully effectuating the right also requires protecting the individual from the 
torture or mistreatment by others.  Non-refoulement is State protection from 
torture or mistreatment perpetrated by the receiving State.224
Shue’s analysis of duties also explains the pressure to expand the 
categories of post-transfer mistreatment that merit non-refoulement 
protection.  Because fulfilling human rights mandates State protection 
against the violation of those rights by others, expansion of non-
refoulement duties is inevitable as the law seeks to deepen rights 
fulfillment.  This development is already occurring.  As noted above, the 
Enforced Disappearances Convention includes a non-refoulement 
 
 
 221. See Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure:  State Obligations and 
Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE COVENANT ON CIVIL 
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 77–78 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (arguing that Article 2(1) of the 
ICCPR requires States to protect against rights violations committed by non-State actors); 
SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:  
CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 24 (2000) (same). 
 222. See Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341, 366 
(2010) (discussing the characteristics of non-refoulement as a manifestation of the duty to 
protect). 
 223. See supra notes 70–97 and accompanying text. 
 224. Not all instances where non-refoulement protection is implicated fall within the duty 
to protect.  During the Bush Administration, the United States engaged in a practice of 
extraordinary rendition, in which aliens were transferred from one State to another for the 
purpose of interrogation using torture. See Charlie Savage, Obama’s War on Terror May 
Resemble Bush’s in Some Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A20.  Rendition involves 
intent on the part of the transferring State that the receiving State mistreats the individual, 
usually to obtain information.  Such intent means the transferring State incurs responsibility 
under international law for its complicity in the wrongful act of the receiving State under the 
principle that a State may not do through another that which it could not do itself. See Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 16 in Rep. of the 
Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, at 43, 47, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) (placing responsibility on State for 
assistance with the wrongful acts of another State where that assistance is provided with “a 
view to facilitating the commission of [the] act”); id. art. 17 (imposing State responsibility 
for wrongful acts of other States where State directed and controlled wrongful act).  In those 
instances, the transferring State is implicated in the commission of torture or other serious 
forms of mistreatment, thereby violating its absolute duty to avoid committing such acts, as 
opposed to its duty to protect from those acts committed by others. See id. art 16. 
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obligation,225 and other human rights bodies are locating non-refoulement 
duties in ostensibly negative treatment prohibitions.226
While this protection duty is well-established in the law, less 
acknowledged is the competing protection duty at issue in transfer of 
dangerous aliens.  Human rights law has in recent years recognized that the 
State has a duty to protect the public not only from rights violations 
committed by other States, but also from rights violations committed by 
private persons within society which it knows or should know are likely to 
occur.  The ECtHR first recognized this duty in its landmark decision in 
Osman v. United Kingdom.
 
227  In that case plaintiffs argued that the British 
police violated the right to life of a family member when it failed to take 
adequate preventive measures to stop a deranged man from killing the 
family member despite clear warnings regarding the threat.228  The United 
Kingdom denied it owed such a broad duty to protect against actions 
committed by members of society, arguing instead it could only be held 
liable where the police “assumed responsibility” for the safety of the 
individual.229  The Court rejected the British position, holding the right to 
life includes positive State duties to safeguard the lives of those within its 
jurisdiction.  The Court explained that the State has a duty to take 
“preventive operational measures” to combat threats where “the authorities 
knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the 
criminal acts of a third party.”230  The Court remarked that the operational 
measures required went beyond merely creating a criminal justice apparatus 
to deal with threats, instead sometimes requiring action to mitigate the 
threat.231
While Osman involved a threat to an identified individual, the ECtHR 
has held this duty extends to society at large.  In Mastromatteo v. Italy,
 
232 
the petitioner claimed that Italy violated his son’s right to life when it 
released habitual offenders from prison before the termination of their 
sentence, and they in turn killed his son.233  The Court noted that this claim 
was different from Osman in that the police were not alleged to know that 
Mastromatteo himself was in danger, but rather should have known the 
released prisoners posed a danger to society in general.234
 
 225. See supra note 
  The Court 
extended Osman and held that the State has a duty to do “all that could be 
94 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra notes 95–100 and accompanying text. 
 227. 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124. 
 228. See id. at 3155–56. 
 229. Id. at 3156–57.  This is the rule adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in DeShaney. 
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). 
 230. Osman, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3159–60.  The Court found that the right had not 
been violated because the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the police knew or should 
have known of the threat the killer posed to the family. Id. at 3162. 
 231. See id. at 3159–60. 
 232. 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 151. 
 233. See id. at 163. 
 234. See id. at 166. 
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reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life” of 
the “public at large,” where they know or should know of the threat.235
The ECtHR is not alone in construing the right to life as including a duty 
to protect the public from the threat posed by non-State actors.  While 
Article 6 of the ICCPR appears on its face to protect only against 
government interference with the right to life,
 
236 scholars evaluating the 
treaty’s negotiating history argue the drafters intended to include a duty to 
protect against violations committed by non-State actors.237  The HRC has 
accepted this duty in its evaluation of State practice under the treaty, as it 
refers to State efforts to protect against the threats posed by non-State 
actors.238  The HRC has also recognized a similar duty to protect against 
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment committed “by people 
acting . . . outside their official capacity or in a private capacity.”239
Given that the law is still developing in this area, human rights bodies 
have yet to define precisely which operational acts the public may 
reasonably expect the State to undertake to protect public rights.  In neither 
Osman nor Mastromatteo was the Court called upon to determine which 
operational actions were required because in neither did the Court find that 
the State knew or should have known of the risk in question.  In three cases 
where the Court did find that the State did not take adequate operational 
measures to protect life, the burden of reasonable action for the State was 
heightened by its relationship with the killers.
 
240
Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that expulsion would be a reasonable 
operational measure with respect to dangerous aliens, at least in the 
ordinary course of events.  Expulsion is the traditional tool used by States to 
mitigate threats posed by aliens.  And its importance is heightened where 
there is an absence of alternative tools to protect the public, which as 
explained in the previous part often occurs in terrorism cases.
  Thus, what is 
“reasonable” in terms of operational measures where the States have no 
special relationship with the offenders remains undefined. 
241
 
 235. Id. at 167 (citing Osman, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3159–60).  The Court held that 
Italy did not violate the ECHR because petitioner failed to demonstrate that Italy’s prisoner 
release scheme systematically failed to protect the public right to life, nor that it knew or 
should have known of the threat posed by these prisoners prior to release. See id. at 166–67. 
  But 
 236. ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 6 (“Every human being has the inherent right to life.  
This right shall be protected by law.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”). 
 237. See MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVEAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLITICAL RIGHTS 120 (1987) (explaining that the 
majority of delegates spoke in favor of the right to life including a duty to protect against 
violations by non-State actors); NOWAK, supra note 99, at 123 n.12 (asserting that the right 
protects against violations committed by non-State actors). 
 238. See NICOLA JÄGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS:  IN SEARCH OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 53 (2002) (citing to Human Rights Committee materials). 
 239. General Comment No. 20, supra note 82, para. 2. 
 240. See Edwards v. United Kingdom, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 137 (holding U.K. failed to 
take adequate measures to protect the life of a prisoner within its custody from threat posed 
by another prisoner); MOWBRAY, supra note 219, at 17–19 (describing two cases in which 
Turkey failed to take operational measures to protect life where the rights violator colluded 
in some way with the State). 
 241. See supra Part II.B. 
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human rights bodies have recognized that the duty to protect from private 
actor harm is constrained by two considerations.  First, any operational 
burden is limited by resources, as any burden must not be 
“disproportionate” to the risk.242  Second and more important here, the 
operational burden is limited by conflicting rights.243
This analysis recasts the issue facing States in transfer determinations 
involving dangerous aliens as a competition between conflicting State 
duties.  The State’s duty to protect its public from threats to life, torture, and 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment conflicts with the duty to protect 
the alien from substantial risk of death, torture, or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment after transfer.  This clash of duties is also a clash of 
rights between the right of the public to be protected from known threats to 
their life and the right of the alien to be protected from the risk of post-
transfer mistreatment by another State. 
  Thus, the rights of 
the alien are a relevant limitation on any “duty to expel.” 
Recasting non-refoulement in this manner is rhetorically important.  
Human rights bodies, advocates, and scholars have been sanguine about the 
risk dangerous aliens may pose to society in significant part because they 
have failed to identify the human rights costs that result.  Recognizing the 
security consequences of non-refoulement as a competition between human 
rights, as opposed to a policy problem for States, will encourage human 
rights actors to wrestle with the difficult problems created when dangerous 
aliens cannot be expelled.  From the perspective of States, frustration with 
the current rule stems from its failure to acknowledge the importance of the 
State’s duty to protect the public.244
Beyond rhetoric, recognizing competing human rights in transfer 
determinations identifies an important shortcoming in existing law:  the 
failure to afford any weight to the rights of the public in the non-
refoulement test.  Put another way, human rights law has categorically 
preferred the rights of the alien to the rights of the public without any 
explanation.  To the extent thought has been given to this issue, it is the 
power of the torture norm that is invoked.  The next section will discuss 
why such an explanation is unavailing. 
  By recognizing this duty as a human 
rights imperative, human rights law better embodies the rights trade-off 
actually confronted by States. 
B.  Is Torture Different? 
The limited justification given for categorically preferring the rights of 
aliens begins and ends with the jus cogens torture norm.  The ECtHR in 
Saadi explains that if the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel and 
inhuman degrading treatment is absolute, and non-refoulement is a duty 
 
 242. Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124, 3159–60. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See supra notes 154–60 and accompanying text. 
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emanating from that right, then this duty must also be absolute.245
The three relevant State duties at issue here are the duty to avoid 
committing torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; the duty to 
protect from such acts committed by other States; and the duty to protect 
from such acts committed by non-State actors.  Human rights law currently 
treats the first two of these duties as absolute, while accepting the third is 
subject to limitation.  As discussed above, human rights law does not 
impose an absolute duty on States to protect against torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment committed by non-State actors within the 
State’s territory, requiring only that they take “reasonable” measures in that 
situation.
  But the 
Court’s simple analysis elides over an important reality:  not all duties 
emanating from these norms are absolute under existing law. 
246
The different pedigree of the duty to avoid torture and cruel, inhuman, 
and degrading treatment compared to non-refoulement draws into question 
the current legal scheme.  The duty to avoid committing torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment is jus cogens, meaning there is near 
universal acceptance within the international community that it is not 
subject to exception or limitation.
  Thus, the question here is whether the law has properly 
grouped the duty not to commit torture and non-refoulement together as 
absolute duties, or whether non-refoulement is more akin to the duty to 
protect from similar mistreatment committed by private parties, where the 
law recognizes limitations on the duty. 
247
 
 245. Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 730, 761 (2008).  Note that 
human rights bodies have not drawn a distinction between torture and cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment in their non-refoulement analysis, despite the disagreement of at least 
some scholars that the latter norm constitutes jus cogens. See supra note 
  While there is a vast literature on the 
difficulty in developing criteria for jus cogens norms, a central feature of 
such duties is a general recognition that the norm protects against conduct 
“so morally deplorable as to be considered absolutely unacceptable by the 
17.  If the 
prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment were not jus cogens, then the ECtHR’s 
already weak argument against considering the conduct of the alien in granting non-
refoulement protection would be inapplicable to forms of mistreatment that do not rise to the 
level of torture. 
 246. See General Comment No. 31, supra note 83, ¶ 8 (concluding that the ICCPR 
requires States  take “due diligence to prevent . . . the harm caused by such acts by private 
persons or entities”); Osman, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3159–60 (explaining that ECHR 
limits protection obligations to what is “reasonable” because of resource constraints and 
conflicting rights); Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 174 (July 29, 1988) (interpreting the American Convention as requiring 
States take “reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations”); see also John H. Knox, 
Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 23–24 (2008) (arguing that 
international law acts purposefully in granting States discretion to determine what protective 
actions are reasonably consistent with national laws and priorities). 
 247. Modern human rights scholars often label as custom norms that do not reflect 
uniform or extensive state practice, but which are widely acclaimed as legally obligatory. 
See John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1200–01 (2007) (describing move to describe norms as custom based on 
opinio juris alone).  Given the widespread prevalence of torture worldwide, this is one 
example of that practice. 
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international community as a whole.”248  To that end, it is striking that even 
notorious torturers condemn the practice and deny engaging in the 
misconduct.249
The Bush Administration’s comments on torture in the conflict with al 
Qaida provide powerful evidence for this point.  Even as the Administration 
subjected detainees to waterboarding, long-recognized as an act of torture, 
President Bush repeatedly denied that the United States tortured.
 
250  Memos 
by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel curiously refused to 
characterize waterboarding as torture,251 despite taking the position that the 
President had legal authority to torture in certain circumstances.252
There is far less acceptance among States of the duty to protect against 
torture committed by other States.  This Article has already discussed 
several instances where States have claimed the right to transfer individuals 
to another State despite the risk they will be subjected to torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment.
  The 
twisted and faulty logic used to define torture narrowly reflects the 
sacrosanct nature of the duty to avoid committing acts of torture.  A duty of 
such a rich pedigree has a strong claim to subordinate all competing duties. 
253  The United States denies that it has 
any international legal obligation restricting transfer of detainees originating 
outside the United States to other States, even where there is a substantial 
risk of torture.254  The Canadian Supreme Court has expressly recognized 
that the Canadian Charter permits the State to repatriate an alien despite the 
risk of post-transfer torture in exceptional circumstances.255  The United 
Kingdom led several European States in challenging the interpretation of 
the EctHR that found an absolute non-refoulement duty within the 
ECHR.256
The willingness of important States like the United States, Canada, and 
the United Kingdom to challenge the legal basis for non-refoulement duties 
is evidence that States see the duty to protect against torture committed by 
 
 
 248. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 
(2006). 
 249. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/SYR/1 (July 20, 2009) (noting condemnation by government of Syria of torture and 
denial of using the practice). 
 250. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President’s Statement on 
the U.N. International Day in Support of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2004), 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040626-19.html 
(“America stands against and will not tolerate torture.”). 
 251. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to John Rizzo, 
Acting Gen. Counsel of the CIA 16 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/zubaydah.pdf (arguing that waterboarding does not 
constitute torture because the suffering induced is insufficiently prolonged). 
 252. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President 46 (Aug. 1, 2002) 
http://www.npr.org/documents/2005/nov/torture/torturebybee.pdf (concluding that the 
President was not bound by congressional legislation banning the use of torture). 
 253. See supra notes 77–81, 156–60, 164–71 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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other States as less important than the duty to avoid committing torture.  In 
this way non-refoulement is closer to the duty to protect against the same 
misconduct committed by private persons, which is recognized as a limited 
duty.  And given the less impressive pedigree of this norm, it is certainly 
more perilous to claim it trumps all conflicting obligations. 
This descriptive difference in the way States value these duties is 
normatively justified by the difference in culpability the law assigns to 
intentional versus unintentional acts.  An intentional act occurs when the 
actor desires a wrongful consequence, or acts with substantial certainty of 
that consequence.  All other acts are unintentional, even when the actor 
does not wish the harm in question, but acts despite great risk harm will 
occur as a consequence of his action.  Many bodies of law recognize greater 
culpability for intentional acts compared to unintentional acts.  Criminal 
law generally draws a distinction between crimes committed purposely 
(with a conscious desire to achieve the objective) or knowingly (with 
practical certainty of the consequences of the act), and acts committed with 
reckless disregard of wrongful consequences.257  Similarly, in tort law, 
intentional torts result in a higher level of culpability than acts undertaken 
with mere reckless intent.258
When a State commits an act of torture, or contracts with another State to 
torture on its behalf, it acts intentionally and therefore with the highest level 
of culpability.  It therefore makes sense for the law to impose the most 
onerous duties on a State to not engage in this conduct because it is the 
most wrongful.  By contrast, in both non-refoulement and protection from 
private person torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the State 
does not intend the harm in question, and in fact may take active steps to 
prevent the harm.  This identical intent suggests that the duty on States 
should be the same with respect to protection from any unintentional third 
party serious mistreatment.
 
259
Still there are some relevant differences between non-refoulement and 
protection from private person harms.  One important difference is control:  
States have greater control over the actions of private persons within their 
territory than over the actions of other States.  Ironically, control may be a 
good reason to conclude that States have a less onerous duty to prevent 
  And because the culpability for 
unintentional acts is less than for intentional acts, this duty should be less 
onerous than the duty to avoid committing these acts. 
 
 257. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 3 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985) (describing the reduced culpability for crimes which are committed recklessly, as 
opposed to those committed purposely or knowingly).  In some instances, such as treason, 
criminal law requires a specific intent for liability, meaning that actual purpose is required 
before criminal liability is incurred. Id. at cmt. 2. 
 258. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. f (1965) (distinguishing between 
intentional acts and reckless acts). 
 259. States transferring an individual to another State despite the risk of post-transfer 
mistreatment will be committing a reckless rather than knowing act because a State is 
unlikely to have certainty about post-transfer treatment by another sovereign, except where 
the State solicits such misconduct, as in rendition. See supra note 224 (distinguishing 
rendition from most transfers where non-refoulement protection is incurred). 
2011] TO TRANSFER OR NOT TO TRANSFER 111 
mistreatment by other States than mistreatment by private persons within 
their own State.  Monica Hakimi posits that a State’s duty to protect is 
directly correlated to the degree of control it exercises over the rights 
violator.260  Thus, she explains, protection duties are at their zenith with 
agents or delegates of the State, over whom it exercises plenary control.  
They are somewhat reduced with respect to territorial subjects over whom 
the State has control, but whose rights restrict protection obligations.  Such 
duties are at their lowest point with respect to external actors, over whom 
the State has the least control.261  Application of this “control” test argues 
that States should actually incur fewer protection duties with respect to non-
refoulement than with other third party actors.262
Another difference may be the length of the chain of causation from State 
action to harm.  In the non-refoulement context the chain is short:  one State 
transfers to another State, which then inflicts the relevant harm.  By 
contrast, the State’s role in failing to protect the public from a dangerous 
alien may be more attenuated.  But this does not always hold true.  In the 
Naseer case, for example, the chain appears equally short:  State action, 
whether it be Naseer’s transfer to Pakistan or release into the United 
Kingdom, leads to the feared harm, with just one proximate intervening 
actor (either Pakistan or Naseer). 
 
Moreover, there is good reason to believe chain of causation should not 
be determinative of State legal obligations.  Cass Sunstein and Adrian 
Vermeule challenge the idea that the length of the causal chain in 
government action, or whether the relevant State action is an action or 
inaction, has any moral significance.263  They explain that governments are 
confronted with policy options, and are responsible for the consequences of 
those options regardless of the length of the chain of causation.264  Consider 
the facts of the Naseer case.265
 
 260. See Hakimi, supra note 
  There HMG had the choice to either release 
Naseer within the United Kingdom or transfer him to Pakistan.  To the 
extent HMG is culpable for subsequent rights violations, it is based on the 
222, at 355–56 (arguing that State relationship with the 
abuser, rather than with the victim, is the touchstone for the scope of protection duties). 
 261. See id. at 357–67. 
 262. Professor Hakimi suggests in passing that the “sui generis” duties imposed by non-
refoulement are due to a unique relationship with the victim, perhaps created by the custodial 
relationship. See id. at 366 & n.158 (arguing that the relationship with victim may explain 
sui generis scope of non-refoulement duty).  But absolute non-refoulement protection is not 
tethered to all custodial situations.  Consider the situation where Mexico is holding a 
Pakistani national suspected of involvement in a drug gang, whom it wishes to release from 
prison.  Under current law, if the alien provides evidence that he is at substantial risk of 
torture by Pakistan after repatriation, Mexico has an absolute obligation to protect him from 
that mistreatment.  If, by contrast, the alien has the same evidence that he will be tortured by 
a Mexican drug gang after release within Mexico, Mexico’s obligation is limited to taking 
reasonable steps to prevent that mistreatment.  The duties are different despite the custodial 
relationship being the same. 
 263. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?  
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 721 (2005) (dismissing 
significance of omission/commission distinction with respect to government action). 
 264. See id. at 720–24. 
 265. See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text. 
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consequences of its policy decision.  Why those consequences should be 
evaluated differently based on the length of the chain of causation is 
unclear. 
Instead, this article posits there is no normative justification for imposing 
upon States an absolute non-refoulement obligation.  Non-refoulement has 
a significantly less impressive pedigree than the duty to avoid committing 
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.  And transfers to 
mistreatment incur the reduced culpability associated with unintentional 
acts.  Without the high level of culpability created by intentional 
wrongdoing, the argument to subordinate all conflicting duties is weakened.  
Instead, non-refoulement is similar to protection from serious mistreatment 
perpetrated by other third parties, where international law recognizes that 
other considerations, such as resources and conflicting rights and duties, 
may limit the protection provided. 
Existing law perhaps is explained by the greater salience of one set of 
rights at issue in transfer determinations.  In the Naseer case, his right not to 
be mistreated by Pakistan was salient in a transfer determination because he 
was the subject of the transfer inquiry.  By contrast, the rights of the public 
are more obscure:  it is harder to identify whose rights are violated when 
Naseer is released into the United Kingdom, especially where his exact 
victims cannot be identified in advance.266
III.  MEDIATING BETWEEN COMPETING RIGHTS:  BALANCING 
  Nevertheless, as has been 
demonstrated, this conflict is real, suggesting non-refoulement, like other 
duties to protect, should recognize limitations imposed by conflicting rights. 
A.  Features of Human Rights Law Balancing Tests 
If there is no a priori reason to prioritize the rights of the alien, the 
question becomes how human rights should accommodate the conflicting 
rights at issue in non-refoulement.  Human rights actors and scholars 
regularly oppose any change to the absolute non-refoulement rule because 
of concerns that accounting for the threat posed by the transferee will result 
in comparing apples to oranges.267
As a general matter, human rights law prescribes balancing to mediate 
between competing rights claims.  Provisions mandating balancing between 
competing interests are expressly included in multilateral human rights 
instruments, such as the ECHR,
 
268 the ICCPR,269
 
 266. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 
 and the International 
263, at 741 (applying these heuristics to 
explain the failure to support capital punishment if it results in reduced homicides). 
 267. See Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 730, 761 (2008) (“The 
concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘dangerousness’ in this context do not lend themselves to a balancing 
test because they are notions that can only be assessed independently of each other.”). 
 268. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 7, art. 9 (balancing freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion against the needs of a democratic society to protect “public safety,” “public order, 
health or morals,” and “the rights and freedoms of others”). 
 269. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 18 (allowing State restriction of freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion where prescribed by law and “necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”). 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),270 as well as 
newer rights provisions in national constitutions, such as in South Africa271 
and India.272  Even in the United States, where rights provisions do not 
include any express balancing requirements, balancing tests have been 
employed in Fourth Amendment273 and Due Process analysis,274 and 
balancing considerations enter other parts of constitutional law.275
These balancing tests regularly require comparison of unlike interests.  
For example, in assessing whether a State law prohibiting Holocaust denial 
violates the right to free speech, human rights law balances individual 
freedom of expression with the State’s need to protect its population from 
harmful speech.  Balancing is also needed to mediate between conflicting 
individual rights.  Should the State recognize a practicing Muslim woman’s 
religious right to wear the burqa or niqab, if doing so threatens the equally 
protected right to be free of gender-based discrimination?  Thus, contrary to 
the assertions of supporters of the current non-refoulement rule, human 
rights law is very familiar with using balancing tests to weigh seemingly 
incommensurate interests. 
 
An important feature of human rights balancing tests is that they provide 
States a margin of appreciation to determine in the first instance how to 
choose between conflicting rights.  This margin recognizes that cultural 
differences may play an appropriate role in balancing.  But this discretion is 
not unbridled.  Instead, the human rights apparatus, meaning courts, 
international bodies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), monitor 
State action and use the tools available to each respective actor to push 
States where it believes the State has under-protected a relevant right. 
The ECHR is instructive in this regard.276  Article 8 guarantees the right 
to respect for one’s private life.277
 
 270. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”). 
  But that article also allows States to 
 271. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27 (requiring a State to take measures to provide health 
care services, food, water and social security “within its available resources”). 
 272. See INDIA CONST. art. 41 (limiting right to work, education and public assistance to 
India’s “economic capacity and development”). 
 273. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490–91 (1976) (limiting application of the 
Exclusionary Rule to Fourth Amendment violations where the costs of application were 
disproportionate to the benefit). 
 274. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (holding that determining 
what procedural due process requires in a particular situation involves balancing competing 
considerations). 
 275. For example, the levels of scrutiny employed to determine whether government 
legislation restricting fundamental rights meets constitutional muster has an implicit 
proportionality component. 
 276. The Human Rights Committee has adopted a very similar approach to analyzing 
whether State restrictions on rights, such as freedom of expression, were in fact 
proportionate to the rights protected. See Rep. of Human Rights Comm., 60th sess., July 14–
Aug. 1, 1997, ¶ 514, U.N. Doc. A/52/40; GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Vol I), Annex 
VI (1997) (concluding that in the case of Faurisson v. France, France acted proportionately 
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restrict privacy rights where prescribed by law and “necessary in a 
democratic society” for one of a list of permissible reasons for restricting 
rights.278  States are granted a margin of appreciation to decide whether a 
particular restriction on privacy is necessary for society, provided that 
restriction is prescribed by law and designed to advance a permissible 
purpose under Article 8.279  For example, this margin has allowed Poland 
and Ireland to maintain more restrictive abortion laws, while other parties 
like the United Kingdom provide women much freer access to terminate 
unwanted pregnancies.280
Nevertheless, the margin of appreciation is not limitless.  The ECtHR 
will set aside restrictions where they are not proportionate to the aim 
proffered.  For example, in Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom,
  Thus, States can strike the balance between the 
rights and restrictions differently, and still act in accordance with the 
ECHR. 
281 the United 
Kingdom defended its practice of excluding gays from the military under 
ECHR Article 8 on grounds that the policy was necessary to ensure the 
operational effectiveness of the armed forces, and therefore was in the 
interests of national security, a permissible ground for infringing privacy 
rights.282  While the Court recognized the United Kingdom’s margin of 
appreciation to determine which restrictions were necessary to maintain an 
effective military, it emphasized the need for those restrictions must be 
proportionate to the aim served.283  The Court then evaluated for itself the 
evidence regarding the impact on military effectiveness of allowing gays to 
serve openly, concluding that these concerns were insufficient to support a 
ban on gays in the military.284
National court balancing tests have proceeded in a similar manner.  The 
South African Constitution includes numerous economic and social rights 
modeled on the ICESCR that include balancing components.  For example, 
section 27 guarantees everyone the right to health care services, but limits 
the government’s duty to “reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of 
 
 
in criminalizing Holocaust denial).  While laws banning Holocaust denial have been deemed 
consistent with the ICCPR, they are not mandated by the treaty, and fall within the margin of 
appreciation afforded States. 
 277. See ECHR, supra note 7, art. 8(1). 
 278. See id. art. 8(2) (“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
 279. See id. 
 280. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, THE WORLD’S ABORTION LAWS 2 (2008), 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/pub_fac_abortionlaws2008.pdf. 
 281. App. Nos. 31417/96 & 32377/96, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548 (1999). 
 282. See id. at 574–77. 
 283. See id. at 580–81. 
 284. See id. at 581–86.  The ECtHR, like some national courts, is empowered to set aside 
State action where it conflicts with the ECHR. Other parts of the human rights apparatus, 
such as the HRC or NGOs, rely on moral persuasion to push States to alter decisions that 
under-protect a relevant right. 
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these rights.”285  The South African Constitutional Court has explained that 
it will defer to “rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs 
and medical authorities” regarding what level of services may be provided 
given available resources.286  Thus, the Court upheld a policy providing 
kidney dialysis only to patients who may be cured, and not to those in need 
of repeat dialysis, as a rational allocation of resources within the 
government’s discretion.287  But it rejected as outside permissible bounds a 
government policy denying nevirapine to pregnant mothers to prevent 
transmission to children of HIV to a child, concluding such a decision was 
irrational given the benefits of the drug, and its availability at zero cost.288
These examples indicate that adopting a balancing approach in the non-
refoulement context would be less difficult than suggested by human rights 
critics.  It would allow States discretion in the first instance to determine 
how to trade off the duty to protect the public from dangerous aliens, with 
the duty to protect the alien from post-transfer mistreatment.  And these 
decisions are subject to comment or even legal review by human rights 
bodies, which then push States to make decisions that fall within bounds 
they believe are acceptable. 
 
Several benefits from adopting a balancing approach emerge.  First, a 
balancing approach allows the law to account for all relevant rights at issue 
in transfer determinations.  Absent a reason for categorically preferring a set 
of rights, this approach best maximizes rights fulfillment.  Here, it is 
important to remember that security concerns are already affecting State 
action.  Competing rights claims do not disappear because human rights law 
believes they should.  States have continued to address security concerns 
created by the current rule, just in a surreptitious manner.289
Second, greater State transparency and a legal rule which reflects all 
relevant interests improves the ability of human rights institutions to 
monitor transfer decisions, to the benefit of human rights.  Currently the 
human rights apparatus makes recommendations consistent with existing 
law that fails to engage with the rights competition actually facing States, 
reducing the value of these recommendations.  For example, Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) has issued reports calling for the closure of the U.S. 
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, while at the same time calling for an 
end to the use of diplomatic assurances.
  Enshrining 
within the law the very trade-off in which States engage encourages States 
to make openly the rights trade-off they now make surreptitiously, creating 
transparency within the strictures of the law. 
290
 
 285. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27. 
  When faced with the reality that 
such a position would preclude repatriation of many prisoners, the group 
suggested resettlement in the United States or Europe without assessment of 
 286. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at 776 
para. 29 (S. Afr.). 
 287. Id. at 774–78 paras. 24–36. 
 288. See Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
at 764–65 para. 135 (S. Afr.). 
 289. See supra Part I.C. 
 290. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 137, at 2. 
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the security risks in such a course of action.291
One consequence of a balancing approach may be an incentive for human 
rights institutions to improve monitoring of diplomatic assurances.  Human 
rights bodies have felt comfortable in a purity of position against assurances 
because of the comfort that the legal consequence of not accepting 
assurances was withholding of expulsion.  Under a balancing approach, 
where transfer may occur even where there is risk of post-transfer 
mistreatment, the benefits of an absolute position against assurances will be 
greatly reduced, and the human rights apparatus instead will have a 
powerful incentive to push both the sending and receiving State to follow 
their assurances. 
  If by contrast the law 
recognized the obligation to protect the public as part of transfer 
determinations, the human rights apparatus would be forced to address the 
rights of the public in its recommendations.  HRW’s suggestions would 
have been more meaningful to U.S. policymakers if they addressed the 
human rights costs of releasing prisoners into the United States or Europe. 
Third, a balancing approach to non-refoulement protection will remove a 
powerful obstacle to State agreement to additional non-refoulement 
obligations.  As discussed earlier, once non-refoulement protection is 
understood as a manifestation of the duty to protect, its expansion to other 
forms of post-transfer misconduct is inevitable.  Full effectuation of human 
rights requires protection from rights violations committed by others, 
including other States.  Such thinking is already occurring, with new human 
rights treaties including non-refoulement protection and human rights 
bodies interpreting older treaties to include such duties.292  But States like 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, for whom existing 
non-refoulement obligations have proven difficult to follow given security 
considerations, are rejecting additional obligations of this sort because the 
protection duty is viewed as too onerous.293
A balancing approach provides an avenue to address these concerns.  The 
scale of prohibited post-transfer mistreatment ranges from the most intense 
(extrajudicial killing, torture), to the somewhat less intense (cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment), to the still less intense (denial of fair trial, forced 
conscription of children).  Similarly, the risks an alien may pose to the State 
where he is located varies from very significant (mass casualty terror 
operation), to somewhat significant (kidnapping or hijacking) to still less 
significant (financial and other material support to terrorist organizations).  
 
 
 291. See id. at 27–28 (arguing resettlement conundrum is “an uphill struggle no doubt, 
but not an impossible one”). 
 292. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 293. None of these States signed the Enforced Disappearances Convention.  The United 
States has been clear that concern about the non-refoulement provision is a major reason for 
its failure to sign the treaty. See U.S. Statement Concerning Draft International Convention 
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 
(2005), http://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87209.htm (“We have clearly stated for the record our 
continuing reservation to the absence of language in Article 16 explicitly conforming this 
text to the principle of NON-REFOULEMENT articulated in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.”). 
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By moving to a balancing approach to non-refoulement, States could 
modulate the protection provided based on consideration of both the kind of 
post-transfer mistreatment and kind of risk to society anticipated.  Thus, 
while the risk an alien may commit financial crimes may not warrant 
transfer to torture, it may permit transfers where voting rights may be 
deprived.  Such an approach would encourage States to accept new non-
refoulement duties, with reduced concerns regarding the security 
consequences of such a move. 
B.  Concerns About Balancing:  Bias and Uncertainty 
Despite the status of balancing as the traditional method for mediating 
between competing rights claims, and the benefits suggested in the previous 
section, the problems of bias and uncertainty may cause critics to 
nevertheless argue that balancing is unlikely to produce a rights-optimal 
outcome in transfer decisions.  States are notoriously biased against the 
interests of aliens, especially those perceived as dangerous.294  This bias is 
enhanced by real political pressures States may face to favor the rights of its 
public over those of aliens present within the society.295
It is worth noting at the outset that bias and uncertainty concerns are not 
unique to a balancing approach.  Under the current rule there is epistemic 
bias with respect to assessment of the risk of post-transfer mistreatment.
  A legitimate fear 
is that bias may lead to overvaluing the rights of the public and 
undervaluing the rights of the transferee.  This bias may be given easy 
effect in non-refoulement because of the difficulty in assessing factors 
relevant to a balancing determination.  Under a balancing approach States 
should consider factors such as:  the risk the alien will be mistreated after 
transfer; the intensity of mistreatment; the risk the alien poses to the State 
where he is located; the nature of that risk; and the likelihood that risk will 
be averted through refoulement or its alternatives.  Given epistemic 
uncertainty regarding these factors, there is an opening for bias to color 
State assessment. 
296
 
 294. See Christiane Wilke & Paula Willis, The Exploitation of Vulnerability:  Dimensions 
of Citizenship and Rightlessness in Canada’s Security Certificate Legislation, 26 WINDSOR 
Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 25, 37 (2008) (discussing phenomenon of “rightlessness” among non-
Canadian citizens present in Canada). 
  
While States will possess human rights reporting regarding the general 
conditions in a receiving State, often that reporting will reveal little about 
whether a particular alien is in danger of mistreatment.  Diplomatic 
assurances are designed to reduce the risk of mistreatment, but evaluating 
the sufficiency of assurances may be more art than science.  Does a 
 295. See supra note 181 (noting criticism of Suresh on grounds that it would open the 
door to bias against aliens). 
 296. The risk of post-transfer mistreatment of the transferee includes two components:  
the intensity of mistreatment anticipated and the likelihood of its occurrence.  In general 
terms, these two elements reflect the importance that human rights law places on the 
deprivation in question, and the probability that deprivation will occur. See Aharon Barak, 
Proportionality and Principled Balancing, 4 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 11 (2010) 
(providing elements of balancing test). 
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particular official have the credibility to make assurances?  Is the 
relationship between States of sufficient importance that following through 
on bilateral promises is important?  Uncertainty allows State bias to color 
evaluation of the sufficiency of the threat of mistreatment and the 
sufficiency of assurances. 
A balancing model would create additional opportunities for bias to 
infect evaluation of uncertain factors.  Determining whether an alien poses a 
risk to the State where he is located will often require assessment of 
intelligence information.297  Even the best intelligence information cannot 
predict with certainty what an individual plans to do.  The United States and 
numerous European States have hyped arrests of terrorism suspects as 
important captures, only to later discover the individual had minimal 
connection to terrorist activity.298  There is also uncertainty about the extent 
to which the receiving State actually will take steps to mitigate the threat 
posed after transfer.  For example, the United States credited assurances 
from Kuwait that two Guantanamo detainees would be monitored and 
prevented from returning to terrorist activity after repatriation.  The 
detainees evaded Kuwaiti security after transfer, and ended up as suicide 
bombers in Iraq.299
Thus, the risk of bias coloring assessments of factors relevant to 
balancing is real.  Given these concerns, a rule utilitarian may argue that the 
law must as a prophylactic measure prioritize the rights of the alien.  While 
it may be that in individual situations the result is a sub-optimal 
maximization of rights, such an outcome may be justified because of the 
inability of the State to be trusted to make a rights maximizing 
determination.
 
300
As has already been discussed, lax enforcement in international law 
weakens this argument.  If the law ignores State interests in protecting its 
population as a prophylactic measure, States will then act outside the law to 
protect their interests.  Moreover, there are tools available to human rights 
law to minimize the impact of anti-alien bias in transfer determinations, as 
   
 
 297. The risk averted through refoulement should consider at least three factors:  the 
intensity of the threat anticipated, its likelihood of occurrence, and the likelihood the threat 
will be averted through transfer. 
 298. The case of the Liberty City Seven is instructive in this regard.  Upon arrest of seven 
suspects in Miami, the Bush Administration announced it had thwarted a plot to destroy the 
Sears Tower. See Damien Cave & Carmen Gentile, Five Convicted in Plot to Blow Up Sears 
Tower as Part of Islamic Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, at A19.  But evidence at trial did 
not match this grandiose pronouncement, resulting in two mistrials. See id.  Ultimately, a 
jury did convict many of the defendants of at least some counts. See id. 
 299. Alissa J. Rubin, Former Guantánamo Detainee Tied to Mosul Suicide Attack, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 8, 2008, at A8. 
 300. See Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights:  On the Place 
and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE:  THE LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 131, 151–52 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007) (explaining that 
institutional biases may require designing rights in a manner that over and under enforce 
rights). 
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has been seen in Canada, the only State to date to have adopted a balancing 
approach to non-refoulement decisions.301
The non-refoulement balancing test itself may be modified to mitigate 
bias concerns by placing a proverbial thumb on the scale in favor of the 
rights of the alien.  For example, a State’s authority to transfer may be 
limited to situations where the risk averted through refoulement “clearly 
exceeds” or is of “significantly greater importance” than the risk of 
mistreatment.
 
302  The Canadian Supreme Court in Suresh may have 
intended exactly this result when it wrote that transfers to torture would be 
permissible only in “exceptional” circumstances.303  This approach has led 
the Canadian courts to reject several attempts by the government to 
repatriate aliens in spite of the risk of serious mistreatment or torture.304
Placing a thumb on the scale in favor of the rights of aliens is a 
compromise between the current rule and a pure proportionality test:  
limited over-enforcement of the rights of the alien is permissible to address 
the risk of bias, without completely crowding out consideration of the rights 
of the public.  The degree of over-enforcement could be increased or 
decreased depending upon the level of concern about bias.   
 
The more attention the balancing test pays to bias, however, the closer it 
moves toward the current rule and the fewer the benefits of a balancing 
approach.  As under-enforcement of the obligation to protect the public 
increases, States will have ever greater incentive to return to self-help 
options to avoid the security consequences of the rule.  This outcome is not 
surprising; the tighter the law seeks to cabin State discretion, the greater the 
incentive for States to resort to mechanisms outside the non-refoulement 
rule to address the need to protect the public.  Thus, altering the 
proportionality rule alleviates bias concerns at the expense of the benefits of 
balancing described earlier. 
Human rights law may also mandate a more robust process attendant to 
transfer determinations.  As discussed in Part II, human rights law currently 
requires only that the alien be allowed to submit the reasons against 
expulsion to a competent authority that need not be a court; to appeal to a 
higher authority that need not be a court; and to be represented during 
expulsion proceedings, with all requirements subject to waiver in 
compelling cases of national security.305
 
 301. See supra notes 
  Greater process associated with 
expulsions could address the bias and uncertainty concerns in two ways.  
First, greater process increases the chances that incorrect government 
assessments of risk may be caught and remedied.  Second, a neutral (or 
more neutral) arbiter may be less likely to allow bias to color assessment of 
164–75 and accompanying text. 
 302. See Kumm, supra note 300, at 151 (explaining proportionality inquiries can bear the 
weight of institutional biases through altering the formulation of the test). 
 303. See Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 
para. 78 (Can.) (describing discretion to deport to face torture as “exceptional”). 
 304. See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text (describing post-Suresh 
jurisprudence). 
 305. See supra notes 103, 105–09 and accompanying text. 
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factors determining whether non-refoulement protection must be granted.  
The extensive procedures provided aliens prior to expulsion in Canada 
appear to have achieved these aims.  The Canadian courts have regularly 
rejected the factual predicates offered by the government to support 
expulsion despite the risk of post-transfer mistreatment.306  Even where the 
courts have upheld the government’s fact finding, they have refused to 
allow transfer on the grounds that the case was not “exceptional.”307
Nevertheless, there are difficult questions that human rights law would 
need to answer before prescribing additional process in expulsion hearings.  
First, are courts well suited to address the factual predicates underlying the 
balancing determination?  Non-refoulement determinations often will 
involve assessment of intelligence information and foreign government 
communications.  The United States has aggressively pursued the position 
that only the Executive has the capacity to make these sorts of 
determinations, and it is inappropriate for courts to interfere.
 
308  The 
experience of other States, however, suggests this concern is overstated.  
Judges in Canada and in Europe have reviewed intelligence information to 
ascertain threat levels and risk of post-transfer mistreatment, including 
review of assurances to determine whether those assurances are sufficient to 
support transfer.309
Still, to be meaningful, court reviews would need to look behind the 
intelligence information proffered by the government.  U.S. and Canadian 
courts have questioned procedures in which the court is asked to evaluate 
claims based on intelligence reports without being able to assess the 
reliability of the sources that are the basis of the reports.
 
310  States may be 
unable or unwilling to subject intelligence sources to even ex parte, in 
camera examination by the courts given the risk of compromising those 
sources.  They may be more willing to allow access to intelligence sources 
in an administrative hearing within the Executive Branch.  But questions 
would exist as to whether an Executive Branch official would qualify as a 
neutral decision maker, capable of setting aside bias.311
 
 306. See supra note 
 
172. 
 307. In re Jaballah, [2006] F.C. 1230, paras. 81–82 (Can.). 
 308. See Declaration of Clint Williamson, U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes 
Issues, para. 10 (June 8, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/116359.pdf (arguing that sharing with the court materials used to make 
assessments about risk of post-transfer mistreatment would compromise U.S. foreign 
policy). 
 309. See DEEKS, supra note 192, at 18–19. 
 310. See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 846–47 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that 
government evidence could not be assessed without consideration of the reliability of the 
sources that are the basis for that evidence); Mahjoub v. Canada, [2005] 3 F.C.R. 334, para. 
54 (Can.) (refusing to accept the Immigration Ministry’s finding that Mahjoub posed a threat 
to Canada without evidence that the Minister had independently reviewed intelligence 
information, including source material). 
 311. See Declaration of Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve, 
Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing, at app. i–v, Al Odah v. United States, 551 
U.S. 1161 (2007) (mem.) (No. 06-1196) (describing bias in favor of decisions to detain in 
U.S. military Combatant Status Review Tribunals), available at www.scotusblog.com/
archives/Al%20Odah%20reply%206-22-07.pdf. 
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Second, should the transferee play a substantial role in the review 
process?  The Committee Against Torture has been critical of the United 
States for not allowing alien terrorism suspects to play a greater role in the 
determination of whether or not there is a substantial risk of mistreatment 
after transfer.312
Third, if courts are to be involved in reviewing the factual predicates for 
balancing, should they be involved in reviewing the balancing 
determination itself?  Uncertainty regarding the factors the State needs to 
consider in conducting the proportionality review strongly suggests the 
need for external review procedures.  But the actual balance (i.e., whether a 
particular level of risk averted through refoulement justifies transfer at a 
given level of risk of mistreatment) might be viewed as a discretionary 
decision best left in the hands of the executive once the factual predicates 
for balancing have been verified. 
  It may be still more difficult to assess threat information 
without giving an alien the opportunity to respond to that information.  But 
how robust should such procedures be?  The closer the procedures required 
in the expulsion process approximate criminal procedural rights, the less 
useful expulsion will be as a tool to protect the public.  Ex parte, in camera 
hearings, or allowing cleared counsel for the alien to review classified 
information, may be a useful middle ground approach to reduce uncertainty 
and bias in transfer determinations, while preserving secrecy of classified 
information. 
The experience of the Canadian courts after Suresh suggests that courts 
may struggle in making what is essentially a policy determination about 
how to weigh competing rights without guidance from the political 
branches.  In Jaballah the lower court held that an individual who had not 
committed actual violence could not be deported to face mistreatment.313
Ultimately, bias and uncertainty, while subject to mitigation, are a reality 
in any system that grants a State discretion to use expulsion to protect its 
public, including the balancing approach suggested here.  Given that reality, 
as well as the unwillingness of States to comply fully with a rule that does 
not protect State security interests, managing bias and uncertainty may be 
the best the law can do. 
  
But the court created this standard itself, in the absence of guidance from 
the elected branches, or the Canadian Supreme Court, on which exceptional 
circumstances would justify such transfers.  If courts are expected to review 
balancing determinations, they will need better guidance from State 
political branches and/or international human rights law on the bounds 
within which discretion is cabined. 
 
 312. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Committee Against Torture, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006) (criticizing 
lack of involvement of those rendered in determination of whether they were at a substantial 
risk of being mistreated). 
 313. In re Jaballah, [2006] F.C. 1230, paras. 81–82 (Can.).  
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CONCLUSION 
Identifying the human rights competition at issue in non-refoulement is 
important for at least three reasons.  First, too much of the post 9/11 
dialogue among human rights bodies, States, and scholars has lingered in 
the void of security-rights debates.  These debates are ultimately 
unfulfilling because neither side has anything of value to offer the other.  
Human rights actors dismiss State security concerns as an impediment to 
the important task of protecting rights.  States view human rights advocates 
and bodies as naïve, unable to appreciate the imperative of protecting the 
population.  The developing concept of duty to protect recognizes that 
protecting the public is not only an important security imperative for States, 
but also a human rights obligation.  This fact has yet to fully permeate the 
thinking of human rights actors.  Once it does so, these institutions may 
alter their calculus on important security-rights debates, including the 
debate over preventive detention.  At minimum, it will allow human rights 
bodies and groups to speak to States by addressing the actual rights 
competition driving State action, thereby increasing the impact of 
monitoring activities. 
Second, the act of identifying the separate State duties necessary for 
fulfillment of a human right can lead to better enforcement of that right.  
One of the most important insights of Shue’s duty typology is that it is 
almost never preferable to have protection duties do all the work because 
doing so almost certainly results in rights violations.314  But this is exactly 
what is happening with the torture norm, as the onus for torture prevention 
is placed on the sending State as opposed to the receiving State.  It is telling 
that the largest number of communications heard by the Committee Against 
Torture are against Sweden, a State with no history of torture, alleging 
violations of non-refoulement obligations.315
While non-refoulement should play an important role in advancing the 
prohibition on torture, it should not play the only role.  Human rights bodies 
and groups need to increase efforts to combat torture in States where the 
practice actually occurs if the right to be free of torture is to be fully 
effectuated.  For example, human rights groups would be well served to 
work on improving diplomatic assurances practice in order to place an 
appropriate burden on the receiving State, which as the actual torturer bears 
the greatest culpability for the wrongdoing. 
 
Third, human rights law works best when the law recognizes State 
interests and then seeks to cabin those interests within reasonable bounds.  
Human rights law is filled with balancing tests precisely for this reason.  
The concept of margin of appreciation allows States to decide how to trade 
off rights in the first instance.  Human rights bodies and groups play a 
valuable role in pressuring States to keep their balance within reasonable 
bounds.  Applying this model to non-refoulement increases the likelihood 
 
 314. See SHUE, supra note 33, at 61 (explaining that complete reliance on either 
avoidance or protection duties is unrealistic, and “almost certainly not desirable”). 
 315. NOWAK, supra note 85, at 160–61. 
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of State adherence to human rights, and improves the quality of monitoring 
activities of human rights groups.  But granting States greater legal 
discretion on transfer decisions must come with realistic steps to correct for 
the threat of bias against aliens.  Human rights law can consider placing a 
thumb on the scale in favor of the rights of aliens, as well as increasing the 
procedural requirements associated with expulsion, while being mindful 
that requiring too many procedures risks once again pushing States outside 
the human rights framework to address security concerns. 
